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PROBLEMS OF LEGISLATIVE OMISSION 
IN CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE  
 
 
Answers of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Croatia to the 




1. THE PROBLEMATICS OF LEGAL GAPS IN SCIENTIFIC DOCTRINE 
 
1.1. The concept of the legal gap 
 
Provide a short review of the positions of scientists and specialists of law of your 
country on legal gaps (how the legal gap is described, what are the kinds of legal 
gaps (for example, the indetermination of legal regulation, lacuna legis, legal 
vacuum, legislative omission, etc.); does the scientific legal doctrine consider the 
reasons for appearance of legal gaps, the problem of real and alleged legal gaps 
and the peculiarities of gaps in public and private law, the positive and negative 
consequences of legal gaps, etc. ?) 
 
In the Republic of Croatia the following legal scientists have studied the subject of legal 
gaps: Professor Berislav Perić, LLD, Professor Nikola Visković, LLD, Professor 
Vjekoslav Miličić, LLD, Professor Đuro Vuković, LLD, and Professor Duško Vrban, LLD. 
The stands taken by the above scholars are based on generally accepted theories about 
legal gaps. In essence, besides the basic meaning of the concept of „legal gap“, legal 
theorists also write about technical legal gaps and value legal gaps. 
 
In the book Država i pravni sustav (The State and the Legal System, Informator, Zagreb, 
1994, 223 – 225), Professor Perić wrote the following: 
 
”No legal system is all-encompassing because existing applicable law is never 
sufficient to solve all cases. There will always be cases that that cannot be classed 
under “their own“ norm because the legislator did not anticipate a case of that kind (he 
did not anticipate its appearance) or omitted (forgot to) provide for it.  
Therefore the legal system is “porous“ (“it has holes“), it is unfinished, unstated. 
Phenomena of this kind are known as legal gaps. These are legal phenomena 
when a case appears that should be legally included, regulated and solved, but the 
necessary legal norm to do so does not exist.”  
 
According to Professor Miličić, various boundary states in law can also be considered to 




legal phraseology, undefined but definable legal concepts, disharmony or breach 
between the intent to formulate a legal rule and its actual formulation, disharmony 
between some dogmatic forms in a legal regulation and the principles formulated in the 
general provisions of that regulation, and the like.”1 
 
He also gives a list of various kinds of legal gaps: “regular and obvious, 
essential/unessential, unhidden/hidden, complete/incomplete, temporary/permanent, 
gaps determined by the quality and scope of a dogmatic value content (the dogmatic 
scope of legal rules/legal regulations),  conditional/unconditional, and/or legal gaps such 
as the ‘silence of the legislator’, ‘technical and value’ legal gaps.”2 
 
Professor Visković in the book Država i pravo (The State and Law, Birotehnika, 
Zagreb, 1997, 218-220) defines legal gaps and also gives some of the reasons for them: 
 
“In every society there are certain kinds of relationships that have the three 
characteristics mentioned that make them ‘governable by law’ (importance for the 
survival and good of the society, containing strong conflict of interests and externally 
controllable), which shows that they should be legally regulated, but they nonetheless 
remain either completely legally unregulated or insufficiently regulated. Relations of this 
kind are called legal gaps.   
This (…) mostly happens for two reasons: 
First, when one state and legal system are overthrown (by revolution, coup, 
secession) the lawmakers of the new state and legal system may not immediately create 
new legal regulations to replace all those that have been repealed so for a time some 
social relations remain unregulated. This happens rarely, at least in modern societies, 
because the new lawmakers usually avoid the grave consequences of legal gaps by 
either lastingly taking over the legal norms of the old order, or immediately enacting new 
norms to replace the ones they repealed. This was, for example, done when the 
Republic of Croatia gained independence from the SFR Yugoslavia in 1990. 
The second and more common reason for legal gaps is the appearance of new 
kinds of socially important and conflicting relations that the lawmakers do not 
immediately recognise as such or are for various reasons late to regulate. This is the 
reason for most of the legal gaps in modern societies where technical advance with 
increasing frequency and suddenness brings new relations that could not even have 
been anticipated several decades or years earlier so the lawmakers could not recognise 
them when they first appeared or assess their importance. In the modern world these 
are for example relations in the fields of: a) ecology, b) health, c) bioethics and d) 
culture.     
(…) 
Besides this basic meaning of the term “legal gap”, legal experts also recognise 
technical legal gaps and value legal gaps. Unlike the basic meaning, where the gap lies 
outside legal regulation (as a relation that has not been regulated), legal gaps in these 
two meanings lie within legal regulation. A technical gap results from the insufficient 
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Jurisprudence: Lessons and Perspectives), Zagreb 2002, p. 142. 




normative covering of a legal relation, of poor normative regulation, a) either because 
some important element is missing, e.g. sanctions or the jurisdiction for undertaking 
legal actions are not prescribed, or b) because the regulation is expressed using unclear 
and undetermined concepts, e.g. abstract concepts or so-called “legal standards” such 
as conscientiousness, integrity and confidence, restraint, incompatibility of character. A 
value legal gap is the view of some subjects that the norm regulates a social relation 
unjustly or in some other value-deficient way, and that it must therefore be changed or 
brought into harmony with the values that these subjects uphold.” 
 
In Professor Vuković’s opinion a legal gap also exists if a factual state is not regulated 
either positively or negatively so that it cannot lead to legal consequences of any kind. 
He points out, “Gaps can appear when the legislator does not delve deeply enough into 
the material he is regulating. They can also be the result of insufficient knowledge of 
legislative technique. The legislator may also intentionally fail to regulate an issue, 
leaving the matter to be solved in practice. Legal gaps can also appear initially, when the 
legislator, after passing the general act, does not regulate all the issues. Or they can 
appear later when social conditions change and the legislator does not keep up with the 
changes and does not react in time.”3 
 
Professor Vrban writes about the boundary between interpretation, legal gaps and so-
called free space (issues that remain outside the legislator’s reach because everything 
that has not been prohibited is legally permitted 
 
„Unlike interpretation in the ordinary sense, when a legal norm exists but there are 
doubts about how to understand and apply it, the problem of the legal gap arises 
because of the absence (non-existence) of a norm. Thus we could reduce all the 
problems in connection with the application of a law to three great typical cases: 
a) Legal regulations are unclear, ambiguous or even contradictory. In this case 
interpretation using known techniques is resorted to (...). 
b) The legal system is not harmonised. In this case there are contradictions between 
different acts. This usually happens when a new law has been passed or if there 
are provisions for special cases.   
c) There are no regulations for solving a specific case. 
In the last case we can speak about a legal gap. (...) 
 
Establishing the existence of legal gaps, therefore, also means recognising the need to 
extend legal regulation to those fields that are not reached by applicable law, i.e. where 
no legal solutions exist. This should not imply the denial of free space. (...)“4 
 
To demarcate between legal gaps and legally irrelevant actions, so-called legally free 
space, and taking into account the nature of law and legal technique, Professor Vrban 
states that legal gaps only appear under the following circumstances: „ a) the legislator 
did not consciously (intentionally) leave out some beings, actions and conditions; b) an 
                                            
3 Đuro Vuković: Pravna država (The State Governed by Law), Zgombić i Partneri, Zagreb, 2005, pp. 107-
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important legal area or legal branch is not regulated and by its nature should be, and c) 
filling in the gap will not contradict the basic principles of the country’s legal order. If 
these circumstances are not fulfilled, it is the case of a legally irrelevant or indifferent 
space. To it especially belong mental life (thoughts and feelings) and forms of human 
communication (greetings, etiquette and the like), some fields of morals and the 
question of belief.“5  
 
Furthermore, Professor Vrban also includes in the question of legal gaps the problem of 
filling them in and in connection with this the role of judges who are not only empowered 
to interpret legal regulations but also to fill in legal gaps by making use of the usual legal 
techniques and reasoning in accordance with value criteria. He mentions analogy (either 
based on laws or legality) as the most frequent means used to fill in legal gaps, except in 
criminal law where this is prohibited.6 
 
The problem of peculiarities of gaps in public and private law and the positive and 
negative consequences of legal gaps have not been considered in Croatian legal theory.   
 
1.2. The concept of legislative omission 
 
Are the legal gaps which are prohibited by the constitution (or legal regulation of 
higher power) distinguished in the scientific literature? What is the prevailing 
concept of legislative omission as a sort of the legal gap in the country’s legal 
literature? 
 
The Constitution of the Republic of Croatia (Narodne novine, Nos. 56/90, 135/97, 8/98-
consolidated wording, 113/00, 124/00-consolidated wording, 28/01 and 41/01-
consolidated wording; hereinafter: Constitution) does not explicitly prohibit legal gaps, 
and nor does the Constitutional Act on the Constitutional Court of the Republic of 
Croatia (Narodne novine, Nos. 99/99, 29/02 and 49/02–consolidated wording; 
hereinafter: Constitutional Act). 
 
The answer to the preceding question showed the kind of legal gaps considered by legal 
scientists in Croatia. 
 
Professor  Smiljko Sokol, LLD, a former President of the Constitutional Court, described 
how the Constitutional Court proceeds when it finds the existence of legal gaps in the 
regulation of certain relations: 
 
“The Constitutional Court accepted and elaborated the principle of the rule of law as the 
basic comprehensive standard in the approach to constitutional interpretation. This is, 
therefore, the objective that can in a specific case of constitutional interpretation provide 
the Constitutional Court with a point of reference in finding a legal provision 
unconstitutional because it includes a legal gap in regulating a relation which, for 
example, has led to the inequality or the discrimination of a certain group. This is, we 
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think, the final line beyond which the Constitutional Court should not go even to protect 
the rule of law, so as not to become a legislator. We therefore deem that the 
Constitutional Court should not, and indeed it would find it difficult to do so, intervene by 
passing a repealing decision in the case when the legislator completely omitted to 
regulate a social relation or relations, which means that no legal provision exists in which 
there is a legal gap or which is connected to a legal gap. 
 
However, the new powers of the Constitutional Court, which were enacted in the 
constitutional amendments of 2000, provide a solution for these and some other 
situations in which the Constitutional Court cannot react to unconstitutionality it observed 
by passing a decision to repeal the act or other regulation. Under Article 128 sub-
paragraph 5 of the Constitution, the Constitutional Court has the right to “monitor the 
realization of constitutionality and legality and notify the Croatian Parliament of the 
instances of unconstitutionality and illegality observed”. Thus the Constitutional Court 
can notify the legislator that omitting to regulate a certain social relation or relations 
leads to an unconstitutional situation.”7 
 
1.3. The concepts of the Constitutional Court or the corresponding institution 
which implements constitutional control (hereinafter referred to as the 
constitutional court) as a “negative“ and “positive“ legislator. 
 
What is the prevailing concept of the mission of the constitutional court as a 
judicial institution in the scientific doctrine of your country? The constitutional 
court as a “negative legislator“. The concept of the constitutional court as a 
“positive legislator”. Problems of the influence of the jurisprudence of the 
constitutional court on law-making? Does the scientific legal doctrine consider 
the activity of the constitutional court when the constitutional court investigates 
and assesses legal gaps as well as the influence of the decisions of the 
constitutional court regarding filling in the said legal gaps? Was the naming of the 
activity of the constitutional court as the one of “activism”, “moderation” and 
“minimalism” reasoned based on such decisions?   
 
“The Constitutional Court is a separate and to a great measure an autonomous state 
body of high authority whose primary task is to supervise the constitutionality of laws.”8 
In legal theory the starting point for determining the mission of the Constitutional Court 
are the powers of the Constitutional Court given in the Constitution. 
 
Jadranko Crnić, LLD, also a former President of the Constitutional Court of the Republic 
of Croatia, writes: 
 
                                            
7 Smiljko Sokol: „Ustavni sud Republike Hrvatske u zaštiti i promicanju vladavine prava“ (The 
Constitutional Court of the Republic of Croatia in the Protection and Promotion of the Rule or Law), 
Zbornik Pravnog fakulteta u Zagrebu, No. 6/01, p. 1163. 
8 Branko Smerdel and Smiljko Sokol: Ustavno pravo (Constitutional Law), Pravni fakultet Sveučilišta u 




“Central government in the Republic of Croatia is organised on the principle of the 
separation of powers into: 
- legislative,  
- executive  
- judicial.  
In this separation the Constitution gives the Constitutional Court of the Republic of 
Croatia a special position. It does not place it in any of the three powers. In this way, 
because this is a regulation that is given in the Constitution itself (…), it makes possible 
the interpretation that there is a constitutional exception and a special constitutional 
category that cannot be dealt with by laws, because it deals with laws – this is the 
Constitutional Court as a separate body of high legal expertise and authority, separated 
from the system of the organisation of power, whose main task is constitutionality and 
legality. 
 
Thus we can to a certain extent speak either about a separation into four powers or (we 
think this is more appropriate) about an inter-power that supervises all the three state 
powers (legislative, executive and judicial) in their competence under the Constitution. It 
is not hierarchically above them nor is it part of them in the sense of governmental 
organisation or any other sense. Constitutional questions are legal questions like any 
others, only with much greater political implications. This also characterises the position 
of the Constitutional Court and constitutional jurisprudence. 
In manner of decision-making and work methods it is close to the judicial power because 
it could be said to judge laws and other regulations, and through the institute of the 
constitutional complaint it also judges individual acts.”9 
 
Therefore, the powers of the Constitutional Court given in the Croatian Constitution 
show that the Constitutional Court is not a body that creates the Constitution or laws (it 
is not a legislator) but a body which, in exercising the function of protecting 
constitutionality and legality, removes unconstitutional laws and unconstitutional and 
illegal other regulations from the legal order; it may in this sense be considered a 
negative legislator. This complies with the theory of judicial self-restraint according to 
which the Constitutional Court cannot allow itself to take the role of a “positive” legislator, 
as this would be in breach of the constitutional principle of the separation of powers. 
Only the legislator has the competence to regulate particular legal relations by enacting 
the corresponding regulations or amending them in such a way as to ensure full 
compliance with constitutionally guaranteed rights and freedoms.   
 
However, to a certain extent the constitutional jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court 
influences both legislative procedure and filling in legal gaps. After Croatia gained 
independence the Constitutional Court was forced, in the interpretation of certain 
provisions, to solve questions of procedure that were not regulated in the first 
Constitutional Act and even to create procedural rules either through constitutional case-
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law or by autonomously regulating certain procedural rules for acting in constitutional 
justice cases in the Standing Rules of the Constitutional Court. This was objected to in 
the form of proposals to review the constitutionality of certain provisions of the Standing 
Rules (Narodne novine, No. 29/94), which the Constitutional Court answered in its 
rulings, for example: 
 
1. Ruling No.: U-I-252/95 of 16 May 1995:  
 
The Public Attorney of the Republic of Croatia submitted an application – a proposal to institute 
proceedings to review constitutionality – noting that he was, under Article 13 of the Public 
Attorney’s Office Act (Narodne novine, Nos. 17/77, 47/77, 17/86, 19/90, 41/90, 83/92) in 
conjunction with Article 4 of the Constitutional Act on the Implementation of the Constitution of 
the Republic of Croatia (Narodne novine, Nos. 34/92, 91/92, 62/93, 50/94), instituting 
proceedings to review the constitutionality and legality of Article 53 para. 2 of the Standing Rules 
of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Croatia (Narodne novine, No. 29/94; hereinafter – 
Standing Rules) and alternatively, that he was submitting a proposal to institute proceedings. 
 
The Constitutional Court accepted the application as a proposal to institute proceedings to 
review constitutionality and legality under Article 15 para. 1 of the Constitutional Act on the 
Constitutional Court of the Republic of Croatia (Narodne novine, No. 13/91; hereinafter: 
Constitutional Act). 
 
It did so because Article 13 of the cited Constitutional Act specifies who is empowered to present 
a request to institute the review of constitutionality and legality, and these do not include the 
Public Attorney of the Republic of Croatia.   
 
 No other act, including the Public Attorney’s Office Act, can lay down who is empowered to 
institute proceedings to review constitutionality and legality. 
 
The disputed provision reads as follows: "On the proposal of the applicant of a constitutional 
complaint, the Court may postpone execution until a decision is made if execution would cause 
the applicant damage of a nature that would be difficult to rectify, and the postponement is not 
contrary to the public interest nor would it result in considerable damage for anyone."  
 
The applicant of the proposal deems that the above provision contravenes Article 127 para. 3 of 
the Constitution of the Republic of Croatia and Articles 1 and 18, in conjunction with Articles 28 – 
30, of the Constitutional Act. This is so because Article 53 of the Standing Rules is a substantive 
norm and cannot be included in the concept of prescribing the internal organisation of the Court. 
 
Furthermore, he states that the nomotechical method of the Constitutional Act on the 
Constitutional Court of the Republic of Croatia does not foresee the temporary suspension of 
execution of an individual act that is disputed by a constitutional complaint; this possibility is only 
foreseen in relation to an individual act grounded in a law or other regulation whose 
constitutionality or legality is under review, whereas Section IV entitled: “The protection of 
constitutional freedoms and human and civil rights” does not allow for the above possibility. 
The proponent finds further substantiation for this view in linguistic disharmony because the 
Constitutional Act in Article 18 uses the term “temporarily suspend execution” and the Standing 





In the proponent’s view, in the disputed part the Standing Rules have become a higher-ranking 
legal act than the Constitutional Act although they comes fifth in the hierarchy of legal acts under 
Article 70 in conjunction with Article 80 of the Constitution of the Republic of Croatia. 
 
On the grounds of the above, he proposes that the Constitutional Court repeals Article 53 para. 
2 of the Standing Rules. 
 
The proposal is not well founded. 
 
The duties and work of the Constitutional Court are not defined only by Article 125 of the 
Constitution of the Republic of Croatia, which lays down its jurisdiction, but by the totality of 
constitutional determination, the organisation of government in the state in which the 
Constitutional Court has a special place and powers outside the legislative, executive and 
judicial branches, as laid down in Article 4 of the Constitution of the Republic of Croatia.  
 
The Constitution and the Constitutional Act define the constitutional powers and position of the 
Court in such a way that it is not under the authority of any governmental body. Only the 
Croatian Parliament is empowered to regulate the jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court in the 
procedure used for passing the Constitution and a Constitutional Act. 
 
Under Article 127 para. 3 of the Constitution, the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Croatia 
shall establish its internal organisation in standing rules.  
 
Paragraph 1 of that article determines what material will be regulated in a constitutional act and 
this also includes “other issues important for performing the duties of the Constitutional Court”. 
 
This determination is also contained in Article 1 of the Constitutional Act in the text “other issues 
of importance for the performance of duties and functions of the Constitutional Court".  
 
The internal organisation should include, besides the usual contents of Standing Rules, also all 
the other questions important for the successful work and role of the Constitutional Court as 
given in the Constitution and the Constitutional Act.  
 
The Constitutional Act regulated some of the matters defined in Article 127 para. 1 of the 
Constitution. Some of the matters essential for performing the duty and work of the 
Constitutional Court are regulated only in principle leaving specific decisions to the Court. It has 
the obligation to regulate these matters in such a way that it can perform its duties in accordance 
with its constitutional position and powers.  
In the section on the protection of constitutional freedoms and human and civil rights, the 
Constitutional Act contains only three articles about the constitutional complaint (Articles 28 to 
30) and these regulate only questions of admissibility, preclusive term for lodging a complaint 
and the contents of the Constitutional Court decision about a constitutional complaint.  
  
No proceedings in connection with a constitutional complaint can be carried out on the grounds 
of such sparse procedural regulation. Therefore the Constitutional Court, faced with a legal gap 
in relation to procedure for acting in matters of constitutional justice, had the power and duty to 
create procedural norms in the course of specific proceedings.  
 
The Constitutional Court thus, in the course of its proceedings, created rules of procedure for 
proceedings in connection with a constitutional complaint by using the equivalent procedural 




Criminal Procedure Act and the like) and in some cases – taking account of the special nature of 
proceedings before the Constitutional Court – it created new rules for its own procedure.  
 
Other courts and bodies vested with public authority use a similar approach, the difference being 
that potential legal gaps in other procedural acts are relatively rare and do not appear in such a 
breadth of procedural questions as in the case of proceedings in connection with a constitutional 
complaint provided for in the Constitutional Act.  
 
The Constitutional Court, of course, considers itself bound by the rules of procedure that it 
created during its own practice, as described above, and it acted in this way from the very 
beginning of its work, until its Standing Rules were enacted. This way of creating procedure 
could have continued, but the constitutional demand of the legal security of those who turn to the 
Court for constitutional and legal protection lies at the very heart of proceedings before the 
Constitutional Court.  
 
The so-called system of precedent binds the Court, which knows its procedural rules based on 
precedent, but this way of work creates considerable problems for citizens who turn to the 
Constitutional Court because they cannot be expected to know the case-law of the Constitutional 
Court.  
 
This is why it is useful for the rules of procedure, formulated in earlier proceedings, to be 
adequately brought together, regulated and made public. 
 
This is also the reason why the Constitutional Court included many rules of procedure in its 
Standing Rules. In this way it restricted itself because it is obliged to act according to rules of its 
own creation; and what is even more important, these rules of procedure have now been 
published in the official gazette of the Republic of Croatia - Narodne novine, and are accessible 
to everyone, which has also ensured the legal security of natural and other legal subjects who 
seek or will seek the protection of the Constitutional Court. 
 
Concerning Article 53 para. 2 of the Standing Rules (which is not a provision of substantive law, 
as the applicant states, but of procedural law), it must be said that this institute represents a 
civilising development in procedural law. This is why it must be allowed for in constitutional 
proceedings instituted by a constitutional complaint against a possible violation of basic human 
and civil rights – constitutional rights.   
 
Constitutional jurisprudence has introduced the temporary postponement of the execution of 
decisions disputed under a constitutional complaint in the interest of the person seeking 
constitutional justice. This brings it into complete harmony with the basic goals of constitutional 
protection, the protection of fundamental freedoms and human and civil rights, which is under 
Article 125 sub-para. 3 in the jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court.  
 
If it were not so, in many cases constitutional protection – without the timely postponement of the 
disputed provision – would not have any real effect on the constitutional rights of the person 
requesting their protection.  
 
What has been said above shows that Article 53 of the Standing Rules serves for the effective 
protection of constitutional rights. 
 
It therefore follows that Article 53 does not deviate, in content and legal logic, from the legal logic 





The term used (postponement of execution) is a legal concept valid in legal terminology and 
leaves no room for doubt, especially as these are cases of the protection of a constitutional right 
of a particular individual or particular legal person. Thus there is no terminological disharmony 
which might affect the constitutionality of the disputed provision of the Standing Rules.; and 
 
2. Ruling No.: U-I-238/95 and U-I-797/97 of 11 June 1998:  
 
J.S. from Z. and the Croatian Peasant Party, Zagreb, submitted proposals to institute 
proceedings to review the constitutionality and legality of Section Three, Articles 22 to 71, of the 
Standing Rules of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Croatia (hereinafter: Standing 
Rules). 
 
J.S. also submitted a proposal for the Constitutional Court, under Article 18 of the Constitutional 
Act on the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Croatia (Narodne novine, No. 13/91, 
hereinafter: Constitutional Act), to temporarily postpone passing decisions on the merits under 
the disputed provisions of the Standing Rules until the final decision is made.  
 
The applicants deem that the disputed provisions contravene Article 127 paras. 1 and 3 of the 
Constitution of the Republic of Croatia. They point out that Article 127 para. 1 of the Constitution 
specifies that a constitutional act passed by the Parliament of the Republic of Croatia by a two-
thirds majority shall regulate proceedings before the Constitutional Court. Under Article 127 
para. 3 of the Constitution, the standing rules only regulate the internal organisation of the 
Constitutional Court, so the applicants deem that the disputed provisions, which prescribe 
procedure before the Constitutional Court, contravene the Constitution. The applicants also 
substantiate their proposals by referring to distinguished theorists of procedural law, 
Academician Ivo Krbek and Professor Mihajlo Dika, LLD. They point out that Academician Krbek 
wrote in the book Ustavno sudovanje (Constitutional Jurisprudence, published by HAZU No. 
321, 1960) that in proceedings before the Constitutional Court procedural provisions from the 
Constitutional Act on the Constitutional Court are primarily applied, and if these are insufficient 
then the provisions of the Administrative Disputes Act or the Civil Procedure Act are applied, all 
with the necessary adaptations. They also refer to some of the writings by Professor Dika 
published in the collection Ljubljansko-zagrebački kolokvij (Faculty of Law in Ljubljana 1993), in 
particular: “.... proceedings before the Constitutional Court may, it seems, only be regulated by 
law, while the standing rules only regulate its internal organisation”, and in the manual Kriza 
hrvatskog sudstva - nijekanje vladavine prava (The Crisis of Croatian Jurisprudence – denying 
the rule of law, Croatian Helsinki Committee for Human Rights, Zagreb, 1995), which reads: “In 
the strictly formal sense, perhaps the Constitutional Court was not empowered to regulate its 
procedure when solving constitutional complaints in its Standing Rules. Substantively, it seems 
to us, there was no other solution.”  
 
The applicants deem that the decisions of the Constitutional Court grounded on the disputed 
provisions are legally non-existent and should be placed out of force (Croatian Peasant Party), 
or are null and void and should be annulled (applicant J.S.). 
 
On the grounds of the above, the applicants propose that the Constitutional Court of the 
Republic of Croatia accepts the proposal to institute proceedings to review the constitutionality of 
Articles 22 to 71 of the Standing Rules and repeals the disputed provisions.  
 





The Court starts by pointing out that it already ruled on the constitutionality of the Standing Rules 
of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Croatia in Decision No. U-I-252/95 of 16 May 1995 
(Narodne novine, No. 33/95). 
 
The position and the powers of the Constitutional Court are regulated by the Constitution and the 
Constitutional Act in such a way that the Constitutional Court enjoys a special position and 
powers, outside the legislative, executive and judicial powers in the principle of the separation of 
powers under Article 4 of the Constitution. Only the Croatian Parliament, when it enacts the 
Constitution and Constitutional Act, may regulate the powers of the Constitutional Court. 
 
The jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court is regulated under Article 125 of the Constitution of 
the Republic of Croatia. 
 
Article 127 para. 1 of the Constitution determines the material to be regulated by a constitutional 
act, among which it mentions “other issues important for implementing the duties and work of the 
Constitutional Court”. Article 1 of the Constitutional Act says the same. 
 
Under Article 127 para. 3 of the Constitution, the internal organization of the Constitutional Court 
of the Republic of Croatia shall be regulated by its standing rules.  
 
In the view of the Court, internal organisation means defining the powers and duties, i.e. the 
scope of work, of the: president of the Court, the sessions of judges, the secretary general, court 
adviser, records and documentation centre, manner of designating cases, manner of providing 
information to parties and other persons in connection with cases that are under consideration 
by the Court. In internal organisation the Court also includes other issues important for its 
successful work and performing the role given to it by the Constitution and Constitutional Act.  
 
The Constitutional Act regulated some issues defined in Article 127 para. 1 of the Constitution. 
Some of these issues, essential for performing the duties and the work of the Constitutional 
Court, are regulated in principle only. For example, the Constitutional Act has only three 
provisions, Articles 28 to 30, dealing with the procedure in connection with the constitutional 
complaint. Taken formally, proceedings related to the constitutional complaint cannot be 
implemented on the basis of such sparse procedural determination.  
 
Therefore the Court, faced with a legal gap in relation to rules for proceeding in matters of 
constitutional jurisprudence, was empowered and compelled to create procedural provisions in 
the course of specific proceedings. 
 
In doing so, the Court used the corresponding procedural rules from other acts, namely the Civil 
Procedure Act, General Administrative Procedure Act, Criminal Procedure Act and the like, 
bearing in mind the special nature of procedure before the Court.   
 
The procedural provisions that the Court created from the beginning of its work until the 
Standing Rules were enacted, bind the Court. 
 
However, citizens who apply to the Court seeking the protection of constitutional rights and 
freedoms cannot be expected to know the case-law of the court, which was also created in the 





Procedural provisions created in earlier proceedings, prescribed and made public in the official 
gazette of the Republic of Croatia, are accessible to everyone. In this way the legal security of 
citizens and other legal subjects that turn or will turn to the court has been ensured.  
 
The basic preconditions for realising the principle of the rule of law guaranteed in Article 3 of the 
Constitution are legal security in general and in proceedings of constitutional jurisprudence in 
particular, and also the effective protection of constitutional rights. 
 
Pursuant to the above, the Court has found that the proposals submitted are without foundation, 
and has not accepted them.  
   
Later the above objections were eliminated by amendments to the Constitutional Act into 
which the disputed provisions of the Standing Rules of the Constitutional Court were 
assimilated.   
 
Siniša Rodin also had a degree of understanding for this active role of the Constitutional 
Court when he wrote the following about the motives underlying the Court’s autonomous 
regulation of some proceedings: 
 
“Various kinds of motives invite the changes. On one hand there is the wish for the more 
complete regulation of procedure. Until recently the theory of procedural constitutional 
law has been almost uninteresting to Croatian legal experts. However, the importance of 
the procedure used by the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Croatia grew parallel 
with the importance of the Court itself. The legislative inertia of Parliament was certainly 
another contributing factor, because in the almost eight years since the foundation of the 
Constitutional Court it has not comprehensively and completely regulated its procedure 
as required by Article 127(1) of the Croatian Constitution. Although it is true that the 
Constitutional Act on the Constitutional Court gives the main determinants of procedure, 
the regular work of the Court calls for additional regulation. The existing legal gap was 
filled by the Constitutional Court itself in its Standing Rules which praeter constitutionem 
regulate special procedural rules for certain branches of its jurisdiction.”10 
 
“The work of a constitutional court, as a kind of inter-power which – through its 
protection of the constitution as a living organism – supervises the constitutionality of the 
acts of all the other state bodies, is a condition for realising the principle of the rule of 
law. This principle covers the entire system of the complex inter-connected rules of 
procedure of all the bodies of the different powers of government so that basic human 
freedoms and rights are guaranteed in more or less the same way on all the levels of 
decision-making in all legal enactments and in their application in the same way as they 
are in international documents and contemporary democratic constitutions. We consider 
that the basic purpose of a constitutional court in constitutional interpretation is the 
protection of the rule of law in each individual case of reviewing the constitutionality of a 
law and the constitutionality and legality of other acts. The purpose of protecting the 
realisation and advancement of the rule of law justifies, in our opinion, a certain degree 
                                            
10 Quoted after Jadranko Crnić: „Komentar Ustavnog zakona o Ustavnom sudu Republike Hrvatske“ 
(Commentary of the Constitutional Act on the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Croatia), Narodne 




of activism in constitutional interpretation when examining the constitutionality of laws. 
This, we think, outweighs the supposed sovereignty of parliament as legislator and this 
is what places the issue outside the framework of what is seen as a political issue. 
Therefore, when protecting and advancing the rule of law the doctrine of self-restraint 
should not as a rule be applied, although it is certainly necessary in the case of some 
truly political issue, for example, regardless of the form it takes, a clash of interest 
between two bodies of the highest state authority that does not enter into the field of 
human rights or the constitutionally determined autonomy of the institutions of the civil 
society.    
 
The principle of the rule of law is an objective which can offer a constitutional court, in 
any specific case of constitutional interpretation, a foundation for finding a legal provision 
unconstitutional on the grounds of a legal gap in the regulation of a certain relation 
which, for example, leads to inequality or discriminates a certain group. This, we think, is 
the final line beyond which a constitutional court should not go even when protecting the 
rule of law, so as not to turn itself into a legislator by replacing the legislator in the full 
and legal sense of the word. Accordingly, we hold that the constitutional court may not 
intervene in cases when the legislator completely omitted to regulate a social relation or 
relations, which means that there is no legal provision that has a legal gap or with which 
a legal gap could be connected. However, an effective constitutional solution can be 
found even in these and some other situations in which the constitutional court cannot 
apply its right to repeal. The Draft for Revisions and Amendments of the Constitution of 
the Republic of Croatia proposes that the jurisdiction of the court should not be limited to 
examining the constitutionality of laws and the constitutionality and legality of other 
regulations with the power to repeal them, but should also include monitoring the 
realization of constitutionality and legality and notifying the Croatian Parliament about 
the instances of unconstitutionality and illegality observed (...). 
 
With this approach and this combination of activism and self-restraint in constitutional 
interpretation the constitutional court may be an important factor not only in the 
immediate protection of human rights and freedoms but also as a body that legally 
restricts, in a system of balance and counter-balance, the omnipotence of the legislative 
and executive powers or, it would be better to say, limits the rule of the majority by 
keeping it within the boundaries of its constitutional powers. (...) 
 
The Constitutional Court of the Republic of Croatia, in the preceding and in the new 
composition, has accepted this basic approach to constitutional interpretation.“11 
 
 
2. CONSOLIDATION OF CONTROL OF CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE 
LEGISLATIVE OMISSION IN THE CONSTITUTION, THE CONSTITUTIONAL 
                                            
11 Smiljko Sokol: „Ustavna interpretacija Ustavnog suda Republike Hrvatske u kontroli ustavnosti zakona, 
Ustavni sud u zaštiti ljudskih prava“ (Constitutional Interpretation of the Constitutional Court of the 





JURISPRUDENCE AND OTHER LEGAL ACTS OF THE COUNTRY       
 
2.1. The constitution in the national legal system. 
 
Present the model of the hierarchical pyramid of your national legal acts (for 
example, in the Republic of Lithuania no national legal acts may be in conflict with 
the Constitution, while laws and other legal acts adopted by the Seimas or acts of 
the Government or the President of the Republic may not be in conflict with 
constitutional laws, etc.). The place and importance of the constitution in the 
national legal system? What concept of the constitution as the highest law is 
developed by the constitutional court? The concept of the constitution as explicit 
and implicit legal regulation. Is the constitution considered as law without gaps in 
the constitutional jurisprudence?   
Article 5 para. 1 of the Constitution of the Republic of Croatia defines the hierarchy of 
legal acts, providing that laws shall conform with the Constitution, and other rules and 
regulations shall conform with the Constitution and law. This constitutional provision 
contains the principle of constitutionality (i.e. the supremacy of the Constitution over all 
other regulations) and legality.  
Furthermore, Article 82 para. 1 of the Constitution provides that Parliament shall pass 
laws (organic laws) that regulate the rights of national minorities with a two-thirds 
majority vote of all the representatives, and paragraph 2 of that article that it shall pass 
laws (organic laws) that regulate constitutionally established human rights and 
fundamental freedoms, the electoral system, the organisation, authority and operation of 
bodies of the central government and the organization and authority of local and 
regional self-government by a majority vote of all the representatives.  
Article 87 of the Constitution provides that the Croatian Parliament may authorize the 
Government, for a maximum period of one year, to regulate by decrees certain issues 
within its competence, except those relating to the elaboration of the constitutionally 
defined human rights and fundamental freedoms, national minority rights, the electoral 
system, the organization, authority and operation of government bodies and local self-
government.          
 
Article 100 para. 1 of the Constitution provides that during the state of war the President 
of the Republic may issue decrees with the force of law on the grounds of and within the 
authority obtained from the Croatian Parliament. If Parliament is not in session, the 
President of the Republic is authorized to regulate all the issues required by the state of 
war by decrees with the force of law. Paragraph 2 of that article provides that in case of 
an immediate threat to the independence, unity and existence of the State, or if the 
governmental bodies are prevented from regularly performing their constitutional duties, 
the President of the Republic may, at the proposal of the Prime Minister and with his 




Article 140 of the Constitution provides, among other things, that international 
agreements concluded and ratified in accordance with the Constitution and made public, 
and which are in force, shall be part of the internal legal order of the Republic of Croatia 
and shall be above law in terms of legal effects.    
Therefore, the Constitution is the highest legal act, followed in the order given below by: 
constitutional acts, one of which, under the Constitution now in force, is the 
Constitutional Act on the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Croatia; ratified 
international agreements; laws (organic and ordinary), other regulations with legal force 
i.e. the decrees with the force of law issued by the President of the Republic under 
Article 100 of the Constitution (in the case of the so-called disorder of competence) and    
decrees of the Government of the Republic of Croatia under Article 87 of the 
Constitution issued on the grounds of authority provided by the Croatian Parliament (so-
called delegated legislation); and finally, substatutory legislation and acts issued by the 
Government (e.g. regulations for the implementation of acts, decisions, standing rules 
etc.), ministries or ministers (e.g. rules of procedure, orders and instructions for the 
operation of laws and other regulations), bodies with public powers, bodies of local and 
regional self-government and other bodes.  
In reference to whether the Constitution is seen as an explicit or implicit regulation, it 
must be pointed out that the Constitution may in principle be applied directly, but as 
some constitutional provisions are as a rule abstract they must be interpreted during 
application. Under Article 3 of the Constitution, freedom, equal rights, national equality 
and equality of genders, love of peace, social justice, respect for human rights, 
inviolability of ownership, conservation of nature and the environment, the rule of law, 
and a democratic multiparty system are the highest values of the constitutional order of 
the Republic of Croatia and the grounds for interpreting the Constitution. 
Furthermore, under Article 5 para. 2 of the Constitution everyone shall abide by the 
Constitution and law and respect the legal order of the Republic of Croatia, and under 
Article 20 of the Constitution anyone who violates the constitutional provisions 
concerning human rights and fundamental freedoms shall be held personally 
responsible and may not be exculpated by invoking a superior order. 
In a large number of its decisions and rulings the Constitutional Court directly applied 
particular constitutional provisions. However, some provisions of the Constitution contain 
only general principles and a framework that requires the legislator to regulate them in 
more detail, to which he is also invited by the Constitution itself. In this regulation 
constitutional principles and other values of the constitutional order directly bind the 
legislator, and the final assessment about the constitutionality of laws and the 
constitutionality and legality of other regulations is made by the Constitutional Court 
through the abstract control of their constitutionality and legality.    
Article 19 para. 1 of the Constitution provides that individual decisions of administrative 
agencies and other bodies vested with pubic authority shall be grounded on law, and 




Article 117 para. 3 of the Constitution provides that courts shall administer justice 
according to the Constitution and law. However, if an issue of constitutionality and 
legality arises in proceeding before a court (either regular or specialized), this court shall 
under Article 31 of the Constitutional Act request a review of the constitutionality of the 
law or the constitutionality and legality of another regulation by the Constitutional Court, 
because only the Constitutional Court has the jurisdiction to do so.  
Concerning the question of whether constitutional jurisprudence considers the 
Constitution to be a “law” without any gaps, the legal position of the Constitutional Court 
is that its powers do not include reviewing the contents of constitutional provisions 
because these contents are exclusively a matter for the body that enacts the 
Constitution. This opinion is given, for example, in Decision No.: U-I-729/2001 of 6 June 
2001 and in Ruling No.: U-I-1631/2000 of 28 March 2001 in which, starting from Article 
128 of the Constitution, which defines the jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court, the 
Constitutional Court pointed out:  
 
“These constitutional provisions show that the Constitutional Court does not have the jurisdiction 
to assess the substantive provisions of the Constitution (so-called “substantive anti-
constitutionality”) because it is legally and factually impossible to review whether a constitutional 
provision substantively conforms with a higher legal act since the Constitution is the basic and 
highest national legal act. It is, therefore, meaningless to speak about anyone’s competence to 
decide on the “constitutionality of the constitution”, and this includes the Constitutional Court.         
However, the procedure of enacting and amending the Constitution may be a subject of 
constitutional review to determine whether the Constitution has been enacted, changed or 
amended in conformity with the provisions of the Constitution.” 
 
2.2. The expressis verbis consolidation in the constitution concerning the 
jurisdiction of the constitutional court to investigate and assess the 
constitutionality of legal gaps.   
 
What legal acts (constitutional, organic laws, laws adopted by referendum, 
ordinary laws, regulations of the parliament, international agreements, laws of the 
subjects of the federation, substatutory acts, as well as laws adopted before 
coming into force of the constitution and other legal acts) are directly named as 
the object of constitutional control? Does the constitution of your country 
establish expressis verbis that the constitutional court investigates and assesses 
the constitutionality of gaps (legislative omission) in the legal regulation? Does 
the constitution provide for any special procedures for the investigation of 
legislative omission?   
              
Under Article 128 of the Constitution, the Constitutional Court shall:  
- decide on the conformity of laws with the Constitution; 
- decide on the conformity of other regulations with the Constitution and laws; 
- may decide on the constitutionality of laws and the constitutionality of laws and other 




passed from the moment of losing legal force to the submission of a request or a 
proposal to institute the proceedings; 
- decide on constitutional complaints against the individual decisions of governmental 
bodies, bodies of local and regional self-government and legal entities with public 
authority, when these decisions violate human rights and fundamental freedoms, as well 
as the right to local and regional self-government guaranteed by the Constitution of the 
Republic of Croatia; 
- observe the realization of constitutionality and legality and notify the Croatian 
Parliament on the instances of unconstitutionality and illegality observed;  
- decide on jurisdictional disputes between the legislative, executive and judicial 
branches; 
- decide, in conformity with the Constitution, on the impeachment of the President of the 
Republic;  
- supervise the constitutionality of the programs and activities of political parties and 
may, in conformity with the Constitution, ban their work; 
- supervise the constitutionality and legality of elections and national referenda, and 
decide on the electoral disputes which are not within the jurisdiction of courts;  
- perform other duties specified by the Constitution. 
 
One of these other duties, specified in Article 129 of the Constitution, is supervisory 
control over enacting operational regulations needed for the application of the 
Constitution, laws or other regulations. Under this article of the Constitution, if the 
Constitutional Court finds that the authorized body has not enacted a rule or a regulation 
needed for the application of the Constitution, law or other regulation, and was bound to 
enact such a regulation, it shall notify the Government thereof, while it shall notify the 
Croatian Parliament about the regulations which the Government was obliged to enact. 
The way in which the Constitutional Court acts in cases of supervision is regulated in 
Article 105 of the Constitutional Act, whereby if the Constitutional Court finds that the 
competent body has not passed a regulation for executing provisions of the Constitution, 
laws and other regulations, and was obliged to pass such a regulation, it shall inform the 
Government of the Republic of Croatia thereof, and if it finds that the Government has 
not passed a regulation that it was obliged to pass, it shall inform the Croatian 
Parliament thereof, by delivering a report to the Prime Minister of the Republic of 
Croatia, or to the Speaker of the Croatian Parliament. The Session of the Constitutional 
Court shall decide about the publication of the reports in Narodne novine. 
 
Under Article 128 sub-para. 5 of the Constitution, the Constitutional Court observes the 
realization of constitutionality and legality and notifies the Croatian Parliament about the 
instances of unconstitutionality and illegality observed, and the manner in which the 
Constitutional Court acts in such cases is regulated under Article 104 of the 
Constitutional Act, whereby the Constitutional Court monitors the execution of 
constitutionality and legality and the Session of the Constitutional Court writes a report 
about any kind of unconstitutionality and illegality it has observed and delivers it in 
written form to the Speaker of the Croatian Parliament, who informs the Croatian 
Parliament thereof. It is by reference to Article 104 of the Constitutional Act that the 
Constitutional Court, in its reports, informed the Croatian Parliament about instances of 




a legal gap in the regulation of a certain relation, led to the inequality or discrimination of 
a certain group. Examples of this will be given in the answer to the following question.      
 
Therefore, the Constitutional Court decides on the conformity of laws with the 
Constitution, and on the conformity of other (substatutory) regulations with the 
Constitution and law (so-called a posteriori control), and it may also review the 
constitutionality of laws and the constitutionality and legality of other regulation that have 
gone out of force provided that not more than one year has passed from the moment of 
losing legal force until the submission of a request or a proposal to institute the 
proceedings. Furthermore, the Constitutional Court may review the conformity of a law 
with the Constitution or the conformity of another regulation with the Constitution and law 
even if it has already reviewed the same law or regulation (Article 54 of the 
Constitutional Act). It also monitors the realisation of constitutionality and legality and 
supervises the enactment of operational instruments. However, neither the Constitution 
nor the Constitutional Act expressis verbis give the Constitutional Court authority to 
examine and review the constitutionality of “legal gaps” in the legal order, nor do they 
contain special procedural rules for such cases.    
 
2.3.   Interpretation of the jurisdiction of the constitutional court to investigate and 
assess the constitutionality of legal gaps in constitutional jurisprudence     
 
The constitutional court as the official interpreter of the constitution. Has the 
constitutional court revealed in more detail its powers, which are explicitly 
entrenched in the constitution, to investigate and assess legislative omission? 
What are the grounds for the conclusions about the implicit consolidation in the 
constitution regarding the competence of the constitutional court to investigate 
and assess the legislative omission? Has the constitutional court formed the 
doctrine of consequences of stating the existence of legislative omission? If yes, 
describe it. 
 
It has already been said in the preceding answer that the Constitution, in the part 
referring to the powers of the Constitutional Court, does not explicitly include the power 
of the Constitutional Court to examine and assess legal gaps or legal omission. 
However, the Constitutional Court met with the issue of legal gaps in its cases and it 
took certain stands both on the issue itself and on the way it should deal with it within the 
framework of its jurisdiction in the Constitution and the Constitutional Act.    
 
The Constitutional Court took the view that it does not have the jurisdiction to decide on 
the existence of legal gaps in proceedings of abstract control, but that under Article 205 
para. 1 of the Constitutional Act it has the jurisdiction to act if it finds the existence of a 
legal gap when it is reviewing the conformity of a law with the Constitution or of another 
regulation with the Constitution and law, or if it finds that the makers of the regulation did 
not completely exhaust their powers to apply the provisions of the Constitution, law or 
other regulation. Thus, for example, in Ruling No.: U-II-1315/2001 of 9 July 2003, the 





1. The proposal to review conformity with the Constitution and law of the provisions of 
Articles 2 and 3 of the Excessive Use of Public Roads Ordinance (Narodne novine, No. 40/00, 
hereinafter: Ordinance), or of the Ordinance in its entirety, was submitted by: (…) 
 
2. The applicants deem that the provisions of the Ordinance mentioned above are in breach 
of Article 25 paras. 1 and 3 of the Public Roads Act (Narodne novine, Nos. 100/96, 76/98, 27/01, 
114/01, 117/01 and 65/02), and of the provisions of Article 3, 5 para. 1 and 49 para. 2 (first 
sentence) of the Constitution of the Republic of Croatia. 
The applicants substantiate the violation of the above constitutional and legal provisions by 
stating that the only activity whose performance leads to the excessive use of a public road is 
transportation, and this activity is not included in Article 3 of the disputed Ordinance, that is, that 
the Minister of Maritime Affairs, Transport and Communications, who issued the disputed 
Ordinance, failed to do so. 
Concerning the disputed Article 2 of the Ordinance, the applicants indicate that it does not set 
standards for determining compensation for excessive use of public roads, as required by the 
provision of Article 25 para. 2 of the Public Roads Act. 
(...) 
The proposal is not admissible in the part disputing the constitutionality and legality of the 
provisions of Article 2 and Article 3 of the Ordinance. 
(...) 
 
4. The Court found that the disputed provisions of Article 2 and Article 3 of the Ordinance, 
and its other provisions, have not set standards for the excessive use of a public road, but have 
only stipulated excessive use of a public road and increased traffic load (Article 2 paras. 1 and 2) 
and activities (Article 3). The disputed provisions of the Ordinance, and its other provisions, do 
not set the criteria.  
The content of the provisions of Article 2 and Article 3 the Ordinance does not regulate issues 
that should have been regulated in accordance with the relevant legislation. For Article 25 para. 
1 to come into legal effect, standards should have been set based on the three cumulative legal 
requirements that represent an indivisible set of legally relevant facts which can only jointly lead 
to excessive road use, and therefore to the obligation to pay compensation. 
Therefore, the Court holds that there is a legal gap in this part of the disputed Ordinance. 
 
5. In accordance with the provision of Article 128 para. 1 sub-para. 2 of the Constitution of 
the Republic of Croatia, the Constitutional Court decides on conformity of other regulations with 
the Constitution and law. In accordance with the provision of Article 55 para. 1 of the 
Constitutional Act, the Constitutional Court shall repeal a law, or some of its provisions, if it finds 
that it is not in accordance with the Constitution; or another regulation, or some of its provisions, 
if it finds that it is not in accordance with the Constitution and the law. 
 
It follows from the above provisions that the Constitutional Court is not competent to review the 
constitutionality of a law, or the constitutionality and legality of another regulation, in response to 
a proposal that disputes the law or other regulation because the body that issued the law or 
regulation omitted to regulate something in it. 








(1) If the Constitutional Court finds that the competent body has not passed a regulation for 
executing provisions of the Constitution, laws and other regulations, and was obliged to pass 
such a regulation, it shall so inform the Government of the Republic of Croatia. 
(2) If the Constitutional Court finds that the Government of the Republic of Croatia has not 
passed a regulation for executing provisions of the Constitution, laws and other regulations, it 
shall so inform the Croatian Parliament. 
(3) The report in para. 1 of this Article shall be delivered in written form to the Prime Minister 
of the Republic of Croatia, and the report in paragraph 2 of this Article to the Speaker of the 
Croatian Parliament. 
(4) The Session of the Constitutional Court shall decide about the publication of the reports in 
paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article in the Official Gazette Narodne novine. 
 
The Constitutional Court holds that, in accordance with the provision of Article 105 para. 1 of the 
Constitutional Act, it is competent to act in the case when, during the review of conformity of a 
law with the Constitution or of another regulation with the Constitution and law, it establishes the 
existence of a legal vacancy, that is, when it establishes that the body that issued a regulation 
had not completely exhausted the authority to execute provisions of the Constitution, law or 
another regulation. 
 
Considering the finding in Point 4 of this ruling, that there is a legal vacancy which has, in the 
opinion of this Court, come about because the body that issued the disputed regulation (the 
Minister of Maritime Affairs, Transport and Communications) failed to completely exhaust the 
authority stipulated in Article 25 para. 2 of the Law of Public Roads, in this Ruling the Court is 
informing the Government of the Republic of Croatia thereof.“ 
  
Unlike the above stand (which was also taken in many other cases, see the examples 
given in the answer to question 3.4.), in a similar case, in Decision No.: U-II-81/1999 of 
13 September 2000, the Constitutional Court took a different stand. In reference to the 
proposal of a group of councillors of the Požega City Council to review conformity with 
the constitution and law of the provisions of Section V of the Požega City Statute (which 
regulated local self-government in the City of Požega), the Constitutional Court found 
that in these regulations the Statute did not regulate the issues which Article 59 of the 
Local Self-Government and Administration Act delegates to the Statute, so it repealed 
these provisions of the Statute giving the following reasons:   
 
7. Under Article 59 of the Act, the Požega City Council has the obligation to regulate by 
Statue the rules for the election and recall of the councillors of local councils, and lay the 
foundations of the rules for local councils that will be valid for the whole City of Požega. 
 
Since the Požega City Council did not regulate these questions in its Statute, it violated the 
provision of Article 5 para. 1 of the Constitution, whereby regulations must be in conformity with 
the Constitution and law.  
 
In the view of the Constitutional Court, this case it is not only a problem of legal gaps but also 
one of not complying with the legal obligation of the Požega City Council, i.e. an omission by a 
local self-government body to regulate local self-government, which is a violation of the 
Constitution of the Republic of Croatia and of the Local Self-Government and Administration Act. 
The Constitutional Court, in proceedings of reviewing the conformity of another regulation, in this 




and if it finds that it is not in conformity with the Constitution and law, it repeals or annuls it, in 
part or completely. The Constitutional Court cannot examine the constitutionality and legality of 
the inexistent provisions of another regulation, and it can therefore neither repeal nor annul 
them. However, when a law explicitly binds a body to issue another regulation to regulate certain 
question, and the body does not do so, then this regulation is illegal and unconstitutional and the 
Constitutional Court, in this case, renders a decision to repeal or annul it.” 
 
Furthermore, in proceedings of reviewing the conformity of a law with the Constitution or 
of another regulation with the Constitution, the Constitutional Court ex officio reported to 
the Croatian Parliament (under Article 128 sub-para. 5 of the Constitution and Article 
104 of the Constitutional Act, which do not explicitly mention legal gaps but occurrences 
of unconstitutionality and illegality) about the need to amend certain legal provisions, the 
existence of legal gaps because substatutory regulations were not brought within the 
statutory deadlines and the omission to amend laws after the Constitutional Court 
passed a decision on repeal in the following cases (but it also referred to the above 
provisions of the Constitution and Constitutional Act in reports delivered in other cases 
where legal gaps were not the issue):  
 
In the Report to the Croatian Parliament No.: U-X-1457/2007 of 18 April 2007 the 
Constitutional Court stated that the Pension Insurance Act should also have regulated 
the requirements necessary for common-law widows and widowers to acquire the right 
to a survivor’s pension, not only married widows and widowers. It reported to the 
Croatian Parliament about the unconstitutionality noticed in the pension insurance 
system which concerns the unequal legal position in the right to a survivor’s pension of 
some family members – common-law widows and widowers, in relation to other family 
members – married widows and widowers. It noted the need to amend the Pension 
Insurance Act so that it also recognises the right of a common-law widow or widower of 
the insured person, as a family member, to receive a survivor’s pension. 
 
In the Report to the Croatian Parliament No.: U-X-835/2005 of 24 February 2005 the 
Constitutional Court, among other things, observed that substatutory regulations are 
often brought after the statutory deadline has passed, which contravenes the principle of 
constitutionality and legality. The Court received a large number of proposals to review 
the constitutionality and legality of other (substatutory) regulations that were enacted 
after the statutory deadline and to repeal them for breach of Article 5 para. 2 (everyone 
shall abide by the Constitution and law and respect the legal order of the Republic of 
Croatia) and Article 14 para. 2 (equality before the law) of the Constitution. In Ruling 
No.: U-II-4343/2004 of 24 February 2005 the Constitutional Court gave a detailed 
explanation of its reasons for not accepting these proposals, taking the stand that the 
reasons of legal security of the existing legal order outweigh the reasons for the 
requests to repeal the disputed substatutory acts.  
 
In the Report to the Croatian Parliament No.: U-X-2191/2007 of 20 June 2007 the 
Constitutional Court notified about the need to amend the Apartment Lease Act, and 





1. The Constitutional Court of the Republic of Croatia passed, on 31 March 1998, decision 
No U-I-762/1996 and repealed the provision of Article 40 para. 2 of the Apartment Lease Act 
(Narodne novine, No 91/96). In the same decision the Constitutional Court ordered that the 
disputed legal provision shall lose its legal force after the expiry of six months from the day of its 
publication in Narodne novine.  
The decision was published in Narodne novine No 48 of 6 April 1998.  
 (...) 
The Constitutional Court observes that the Croatian Parliament failed, in the period from the 
publication of the stated Constitutional Court decision (6 April 1998) to the date when its 
repealing effect enters into force (6 October, 1998), to revise or amend Article 40 of the 
Apartment Lease Act in accordance with the legal stand expressed in the stated Constitutional 
Court decision, and it has failed to do so by the time of asserting this Report.  
 (...) 
4.  Pursuant to the provisions of Article 31 of the Constitutional Act on the Constitutional 
Court of the Republic of Croatia (hereinafter: the Constitutional Act), Constitutional Court 
decisions are obligatory and all bodies of the central government shall, within their constitutional 
and legal jurisdiction, execute the decisions of the Constitutional Court.     
 
The Constitutional Court notes that, within its jurisdiction, it has no authority to remove the 
inconsistency in the application of the Apartment Lease Act that came about after the repealed 
legal provision lost its force.  
(...) 
It follows that only the legislator is empowered to regulate, by passing the respective revisions 
and amendments to the Apartment Lease Act, the disputed legal relations in the manner that will 
ensure the equality of all before the law.  
 
5. Monitoring the execution of constitutionality and legality, and bearing in mind the 
obligatory execution of Constitutional Court decisions (Article 31 of the Constitutional Act), 
pursuant to Article 128 sub-para. 5 of the Constitution of the Republic of Croatia and Article 104 
of the Constitutional Act, this Report is being delivered to the Croatian Parliament. 
 
The above practice of constitutional justice shows that the Constitutional Court 
differentiates between two kinds of cases in reference to legal gaps. One is when the 
law-maker omits to enact a regulation as a whole or part of it (complete absence of rule) 
and his obligation to do so and the statutory deadline were prescribed by a hierarchically 
higher regulation (e.g. Ruling No.: U-II-1315/2001 of 9 July 2003). The second is when 
the Court finds, during proceedings of reviewing the conformity of a law with the 
Constitution or of another regulation with the Constitution and law, that the legislator or 
other law-maker formulated a provision in such a way that its wording leads to 
constitutionally unacceptable inequality or discrimination (incomplete rule, e.g. Report 
No.: U-X-1457/2007 of 18 April 2007). 
 
Furthermore, the Constitutional Court encountered legal gaps in proceedings of concrete 
control when it examined, in reference to constitutional complaints, whether the general 
courts interpreted existing legal gaps in conformity with the Constitution.  An example of 
this is the case in which the applicant (a natural person) lodged a constitutional 
complaint for, among other things, the violation of the right to the equality of all before 
the law and the right to work, earnings and social security. He appealed against a 




dispute in which the Supreme Court found that the applicant’s employment had ended 
because a new firm had been created from a working unit of the former firm on the 
grounds of the Decree Prohibiting the Disposal of Real Property on the Territory of the 
Republic of Croatia (Narodne novine, No. 52/91, hereinafter: Decree). In the reasoning 
for Decision No.: U-III-1621/2001 of 30 March 2005, in which it quashed the judgment of 
the Supreme Court of the Republic of Croatia, the Constitutional Court, among other 
things, stated: 
 
5. The Constitutional Court of the Republic of Croatia finds no grounds for the view given by 
the revision court, because Article 6 of the Decree from 1991 recognises the right of workers in a 
working unit to decide how they will set up the new form of organisation, which also implies their 
right to decide on their status in labour law. Otherwise the form of organisation would be to the 
detriment of the workers, which contravenes the legal purpose of the Decree which was issued 
to protect the economic interest of the Republic of Croatia under the current circumstances.     
It must also be noted that the above Decree from 1991, although it does not explicitly regulate 
relations in labour law and the status in labour law of the existing workers, cannot be interpreted 
to the detriment of the workers because of the existence of a legal gap. Accepting the legal 
opinion of the Supreme Court would imply that the new legal person has the right to organise 
itself without any obligation towards the fact that it employs workers at the moment of its 
organisation, which was undoubtedly not the purpose of the Decree.    
The Court took the identical stand in case No.: U-III-1027/1998 of 26 January 2001. 
 
Another kind of case instituted by a constitutional complaint was when applicants 
objected to the violation of their right to a trial in a reasonable time and access to court in 
civil suits for compensation of damage caused by terrorist acts or by members of the 
Croatian Army and police force in connection with their service during the Homeland 
War. The Obligations Act prescribed the State’s responsibility in the above cases but it 
was amended to stay all civil suits of this kind until special laws are passed regulating 
the State’s responsibility in the above cases. Although the amendments of the 
Obligations Act prescribed a deadline for the legislator to pass the new regulation, he did 
not obey this deadline even approximately but passed the regulations much later 
(therefore, until the special laws were passed there was a legal gap, and the stay of 
proceedings by the force of law made it impossible for the competent courts to during 
that time undertake actions with the purpose of deciding about the claims). In such 
cases the Constitutional Court passed decisions (e.g. Decision No.: U-IIIA-892/2002 of 7 
July 2004 and many others) finding a violation of the right to a trial in a reasonable time 
and a violation of the right of access to court and awarded appropriate compensation for 
the violation of the above constitutional rights.   
 
The Constitutional Court has not formed a doctrine of the consequences of stating the 
existence of legislative omission.  
 
2.4. The establishment, either in the law which regulates the activity of the 
constitutional court or in other legal act, of the jurisdiction of the constitutional 
court to investigate and assess the constitutionality of legal gaps. 
 




activity of the constitutional court or in other legal act (if this is not directly 
established in the constitution)) to investigate and assess legal gaps in the legal 
regulation established in laws and other legal acts. Does the law (or other legal 
act) provide for any special procedure for investigation into legal omission? If 
yes, describe them briefly. What decisions, under this law or other legal act, does 
the constitutional court adopt after it has stated the existence of the legislative 
omission? Does the said law or legal act provide as to who and how must remove 
the legislative omission? Is it provided for in other laws and legal acts (for 
example, the regulation of the parliament)?     
 
The answers to questions 2.2. and 2.3., which presented the relevant provisions of the 
Constitution and the Constitutional Act and the practice of constitutional justice, showed 
the powers of the Constitutional Court to investigate and assess the constitutionality of 
legal omission. Pursuant to the above, and in connection with the Constitutional Court’s 
powers to monitor the execution of constitutionality and legality (Article 104 of the 
Constitutional Act) and supervise passing operational instruments (Article 105 of the 
Constitutional Act), it must be noted that in these cases the Constitutional Act does not 
lay down the procedure nor the persons empowered to institute proceedings, but in 
accordance with the practice of constitutional justice any natural or legal person may 
apply to the Constitutional Court under the provisions of Articles 104 and 105 of the 
Constitutional Act. The applications filed under these articles to date show that as a rule 
the applicant claimed that certain operational regulations that by Constitution, law or 
some other regulation should have been passed within a certain deadline, had not been 
passed. In such proceedings the Constitutional Court requests the body competent for 
passing the operational regulation to declare whether the regulation has been passed, 
and if not why. On the grounds of this declaration, if the regulation has been passed the 
Constitutional Court informs the applicant thereof, and if it has not been passed decides 
on further proceedings under Articles 104 and 105 of the Constitutional Act. 
 
The Constitutional Act does not stipulate who and how must remove the 
unconstitutionality and illegality noted in the report, or the omission to pass operational 
instruments, but only states that the Constitutional Court is reporting about this either to 
the Government or to Parliament. No other regulation, including the Standing Rules of 
the Croatian Parliament, specially prescribe how, after the report of the Constitutional 
Court is delivered, the legal omission it refers will be removed, nor are there any 
provisions about how to act after the report of the Constitutional Court is received. In 
connection with the reports, the competent bodies act on the grounds of the same rules 
they use to enact laws and other regulations.     
 
 
3. LEGISLATIVE OMISSION AS AN OBJECT OF INVESTIGATION BY THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL COURT 
 
3.1. Application to the constitutional court 
 




raise the question of legislative omission? 
 
Natural and legal persons may submit various kinds of applications to the Constitutional 
Court (constitutional complaints, proposals, requests, appeals etc.) to institute various 
kinds of proceedings provided for in the Constitution and the Constitutional Act (see 
answer to question 2.2.). However, instituting proceedings in the case of legislative 
omission is not regulated in the Constitution or in the Constitutional Act or in the 
Standing Rules of the Constitutional Court (nor do they recognise the concept of 
legislative omission) so there is no rule about who may raise the question of legislative 
omission. Therefore we show below which subjects are empowered to institute 
proceedings in which they, among other things, also raised the question of the existence 
of legislative omission. As a rule these were proceedings reviewing the conformity of 
laws with the Constitution and other regulations with the Constitution and law, and 
proceedings instituted by a constitutional complaint. The answers to questions 2.2-2.4. 
have already shown in detail the proceedings in which the Constitutional Court was 
requested to act under Articles  104 and 105 of the Constitutional Act. 
 
Reviewing the conformity of laws with the Constitution and other regulations with the 
Constitution and law. 
 
Under the provisions of the Constitutional Act, proceedings reviewing the conformity of 
laws with the Constitution and other regulations with the constitution and law:  
- are presented by request by one fifth of the members of the Croatian Parliament, a 
committee of the Croatian Parliament, the President of the Republic of Croatia, the 
Government of the Republic of Croatia (to review the constitutionality and legality of 
regulations), the Supreme Court of the Republic of Croatia or another court of justice, if 
the issue of constitutionality and legality has arisen in proceedings conducted before that 
particular court of justice, and the People's Ombudsman when the question of 
constitutionality and legality appears in his proceedings (Article 35 of the Constitutional 
Act);  
- the representative body of a unit of local or regional self-government in the Republic of 
Croatia, if it considers that a law regulating the organisation, competence or financing of 
units of local and regional self-government is not in accordance with the Constitution, 
may present a request with the Constitutional Court to review the constitutionality of that 
law or some of its provisions (Article 36 para. 1 of the Constitutional Act); 
- every individual or legal person has the right to propose the institution of proceedings 
to review the constitutionality of the law and the legality and constitutionality of other 
regulations (Article 38 para. 1 of the Constitutional Act), in which the existence of legal 
interest is not required; and 
- the Constitutional Court may institute proceedings ex officio (Article 38 para. 2 of the 
Constitutional Act). 
 
It is in this kind of proceedings (so-called abstract control) that the Constitutional Court 
finds out about the existence of legal gaps (it states their existence in the reasoning for 
its decisions and rulings, but it does not review them), even when the parties do not 
explicitly refer to them. So far the proponents (usually natural persons, companies and 




Constitutional Court rejected such proposals for lack of jurisdiction and decided, 
depending on the circumstances, about further proceedings under Articles 104 and 105 
of the Constitutional Act. If it was a case of a hierarchically higher regulation providing 
for something to be regulated by a hierarchically lower or operational regulation, and this 
had not been done, the Court acted in accordance with Article 105 of the Constitutional 
Act (e.g. Ruling No.: U-II-1315/2001 of 9 July 2003, see answer to question 2.3.), and if 
it was a case of an incomplete rule contextually conceived in such a way that it led to the 
inequality or discrimination of a certain group, it acted in accordance with Article 104 of 
the Constitutional Act (e.g. U-X-1457/2007 of 18 April 2007, see answer to question 
2.3.). As a rule these were cases when the “inexistence of a norm” made it objectively 
impossible to repeal either the provision or its part. Because of the incomplete nature of 
the provision or regulation it was necessary to supplement it with the required normative 
contents, not repeal it.  
 
The constitutional complaint for the protection of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms guaranteed in the Constitution.  
 
Another kind of proceedings in which the question of legal gaps appeared directly or 
indirectly, but rarely, were those instituted by the constitutional complaint (so-called 
concrete control). In the Republic of Croatia, everyone may lodge a constitutional 
complaint with the Constitutional Court if he deems that the individual act of a body of 
the central government, a body of local and regional self-government, or a legal person 
with public authority, which decided about his rights and obligations, or about suspicion 
or accusation for a criminal act, violated his human rights or fundamental freedoms 
guaranteed by the Constitution, or his right to local and regional self-government 
guaranteed in the Constitution (hereinafter: constitutional right). These are proceedings 
(Article 62 of the Constitutional Act) in which it is necessary for the applicant to exhaust 
all the legal remedies and to lodge the constitutional complaint within 30 days from the 
day he received the decision that all the legal remedies have been exhausted. 
Furthermore, the Constitutional Court may institute proceedings in response to a 
constitutional complaint even before all the legal remedies have been exhausted (Article 
63 of the Constitutional Act) in cases when the court of justice did not decide within a 
reasonable time about the rights and obligations of the party, or about the suspicion or 
accusation for a criminal offence, or in cases when the disputed individual act grossly 
violates constitutional rights and it is completely clear that grave and irreparable 
consequences may arise for the applicant if Constitutional Court proceedings are not 
initiated.         
 
3.2. Legislative omission in the petitions of the petitioners. 
 
May the petitioners who apply to the constitutional court ground their doubts on 
the constitutionality of the disputed law or other act on the fact that there is a 
legal gap (legislative omission) in the said law or act? What part of the petitions 
received at the constitutional court is comprised of the petitions, wherein the 
incompliance of the act with the constitution is related to the legislative 




relatively more often specify in their petitions the legislative omission as the 
reason of the act’s being in conflict with the constitution? Are there any specific 
requirements provided for as regards the form, contents and structure of the 
applications concerning the unconstitutionality of the legislative omission? If yes, 
describe them. Are they established in the law which regulates the activity of the 
constitutional court or are they formulated in the constitutional jurisprudence?   
 
The answers to these questions have partly already been given in the answers to 
questions 2.3. and 3.1. of this Questionnaire.  
 
In the proceedings of reviewing the constitutionality of laws and the constitutionality and 
legality of other regulations the empowered petitioners (usually natural persons, and 
among legal persons companies and associations) have, in relation to the total number 
of cases of this kind (in the period from 1991 to 31 December 2007, of the 5,628 filed 
cases 4,728 were solved), rarely raised the question of a legal gap as the reason for the 
unconstitutionality of laws or the unconstitutionality and illegality of other regulations. 
The number of cases that referred to legal gaps is very small (a text search of the 
Constitutional Court’s decisions base resulted in a rough estimate of about twenty 
solved cases from 1991 to 31 December 2007) in relation to the total number of cases, 
and the Constitutional Court does not keep a special record of such cases. 
 
In the proceedings of monitoring constitutionality and legality (Article 104 of the 
Constitutional Act) and supervisory control over passing operational regulations (Article 
105 of the Constitutional Act) in the period from 1991 to 31 December 2007, of a total 
number of 221 filed cases 155 were solved, but the Constitutional Court delivered a 
report to the competent body in only several of them. If the number of these cases is 
compared with the total number of solved cases in the same period (in all kinds of 
proceedings), i.e. 32,146 solved cases of a total number of 39,466 filed cases, this is a 
small number of cases in relation to the total number of cases dealt with by the 
Constitutional Court.   
 
The Constitution and the Constitutional Act do not provide for a special procedure for 
reviewing the constitutionality of legislative omission so no special conditions are 
prescribed for the form, contents and structure of applications concerning 
unconstitutionality caused by legislative omission, nor have these been established in 
constitutional jurisprudence (bearing in mind what has already been said in the answers 
to questions 2.2., 2.3., 2.4. and 3.1.). The Constitutional Act stipulates the form of a 
request (Article 39) or a proposal (Article 40) to review the constitutionality of laws or the 
constitutionality and legality of other regulations, and of a constitutional complaint 
(Article 65), and if the applicants also raise the question of possible legal gaps in these 
applications it is not necessary because of that for them to comply with any special, 
additional conditions in form, contents and structure. 
 






Does the constitutional court begin the investigation of the legislative omission ex 
officio on its own initiative while considering the petition and upon what does it 
ground it (if the petitioner does not request to investigate the question of the 
legislative omission)? Specify more typical cases and describe the reasoning of 
the court in more detail. 
 
Generally, the Constitutional Court finds out about the existence of legal gaps and/or 
legislative omission from the applications of its petitioners, as a rule in proceedings of 
reviewing the constitutionality of laws and the constitutionality and legality of other 
regulations, regardless of whether they bring up the question of a legal gap or not. An 
example of this is Decision No.: U-I-1152/2000 etc. of 18 April 2007, rendered in 
proceedings reviewing the constitutionality of the Pension Insurance Act (Narodne 
novine, Nos. 102/98, 127/00, 59/01, 109/01, 147/02, 117/03, 30/04, 177/04 and 92/05, 
hereinafter: PIA) instituted by the proposals of several natural persons, in which the 
Constitutional Court, among other things, stated as follows:  
 
20.  On the other hand, the applicant A.M. deems that Article 21 para. 1 sub-para. 1 PIA 
contravenes the Constitution because she, as the common-law widow of the deceased insured 
person, does not have the right to a survivor’s pension. This is an issue of the legal equality of 
common-law widows/widowers with married widows/widowers in entitlement to a survivor’s 
pension after the death of the spouse.   
 
The Constitutional Court notes that the PIA entitles divorced spouses to a survivor’s pension (if 
the court has granted them the right to maintenance), but not the common-law widow/widower of 
a deceased insured person (even in cases when the court has granted them the right to 
maintenance). 
 
Article 61 of the Constitution provides as follows: 
Article 61 
The family shall enjoy special protection of the State.  
Marriage and legal relations in marriage, common-law marriage and families shall be regulated 
by law.  
 
In the Republic of Croatia the family is under the special protection of the state, so it represents 
a protected constitutional benefit. Marriage and common-law marriage are constitutionally 
recognised unions. In family matters, the Constitution makes no difference between marriage 
and common-law marriage. Both unions are recognised in the Constitution and both are 
regulated by law. 
 
It follows from the above that not recognising entitlement to a survivor’s pension for the 
common-law widow or widower of a deceased insured person leads to inequality between two 
constitutionally-recognised family unions, which contravenes equality as a highest value of the 
constitutional order of the Republic of Croatia, provided for in Article 3 of the Constitution. 
 
In accordance with the above, starting from Article 61 of the Constitution which recognises two 
kinds of family unions, and taking into account the legal nature and purpose of a survivor’s 
pension in the pension insurance system, which is based on the obligation of the insured person 




finds that the PIA should regulate entitlement to a survivor’s pension not only to married widows 
and widowers, but also to common-law widows and widowers.   
 
Thus the Constitutional Court will, under its powers in Article 128 sub-para. 5 of the Constitution 
and Article 104 of the Constitutional Act, report to the Croatian Parliament about this instance of 
unconstitutionality, i.e. about the need for the necessary amendment of the PIA so as to entitle 
common-law spouses to a survivor’s pension within the PIA regulated pension insurance 
scheme. 
  
In this case the Constitutional Court cannot avail itself of its powers under Article 130 para. 1 of 
the Constitution and Article 55 para. 1 of the Constitutional Act, because repealing Article 21 
para. 1 sub-para. 1 PIA would groundlessly deprive married widows/widowers of the right to a 
survivor’s pension (Article 62 PIA clearly shows that only married spouses are considered 
widows/widowers in the sense of the disputed Article 21 para. 1 sub-para. 1 PIA), which would 
not achieve the purpose for which the proponent submitted to the Constitutional Court the 
proposal to review conformity with the Constitution of Article 21 para. 1 sub-para. 1 PIA.    
 
Furthermore, this purpose would also not be accomplished by repealing Article 21 para. 1 sub-
para. 1 PIA because this article is grounded on the legal view that married partners have the 
duty to support one another and their children (see point 19.1 above). On the other hand, the 
existence of a common-law marriage, as a condition for recognising entitlement to a survivor’s 
pension, would by the nature of things have to be proved in special proceedings, which requires 
an amendment of the PIA, not the repeal of the existing legal arrangement.    
 
The reasons for the decision quoted above also show why the Constitutional Court does 
not repeal laws and other regulations (or provisions thereof) when it finds a legal gap or 
legislative omission. On the grounds of the unconstitutionality noticed, which appeared 
in the unequal legal position of family members – common-law widows or widowers - in 
realising the right to a survivor’s pension and the established need to amend the above 
provision of the PIA, the Constitutional Court, under Article 128 sub-para. 5 of the 
Constitution and Article 104 of the Constitutional Act, delivered to the Croatian 
Parliament Report No.: U-X-1457/2007 of 18 April 2007, in the reasons for which it 
stated the following: 
 
1.  In the pension system regulated by the Pension Insurance Act (Narodne novine, Nos. 
102/98, 127/00, 59/01, 109/01, 147/02, 117/03, 30/04, 177/04 and 92/05; hereinafter: PIA), a 
survivor’s pension is a long-term monthly income from pension insurance to which certain family 
members are entitled after the death of the insured person under general and special legal 
conditions. This pension is recognised on the grounds of the contributions paid by the insured 
person for old age, disability or death, and is based on the obligation of spouses (insured 
persons) to support one another and their children, and other members of their family, under 
statutory conditions          
Article 21 paragraph 1 PIA defines persons who are considered family members: 
 
C. THE INSURED PERSON'S FAMILY MEMBERS 
Article 21 
(1) In the event of the death of the insured person or of the beneficiary of a statutory or early old-
age or disability pension, the following members of their families shall be insured: 
1) widow or widower 




3) children (marital, extramarital, or adopted) 
4) foster-children supported by the insured person, grandchildren supported by the insured 
person – provided that they have no parents, or if their only parent is or both parents are 
completely disabled for work,  
5) parents – father, mother, stepfather, stepmother and fosterer of the insured person, who were 
supported by the insured person 
6) children with no parents – brothers, sisters and other children the insured person supported, 
provided they have no parents, or if they only parent is or both parents are disabled for work. 
  
In the case of the closest family members (widow/widower, children of certain age), PIA is based 
on the obligation of spouses to support one another and their children.  
On the other hand, in the case of other family members (divorced spouse, foster children, 
grandchildren, parents and children of certain age) the PIA requires that the insured person 
supported them until his/her death, and it is therefore necessary in all these cases to establish 
this fact in respective proceedings. 
 
2.  Pursuant to Article 62 PIA, widows/widowers, within the meaning of Article 21 para 1 sub-
para. 1 PIA, are only those widows/widowers who lived in a married union with a deceased 
insured person. It reads:   
Article 62 
(1) A widow shall be entitled to a survivor’s pension:  
1) if before the death of her spouse, from whom she derives the entitlement, she has reached 
the age of 50, or  
2) if she is below the age of 50 and if she has suffered general disability for work prior to her 
spouse's death, or if such disability arose within one year after her spouse's death, or        
3) if after the death of her spouse, the widow performed parental duties for one or more children 
who are entitled to a survivor's pension after their father's death. If the widow suffers general 
disability for work during the utilisation of the entitlement from the above mentioned title, she 
shall continue to be entitled to a survivor's pension as long as such disability exists.    
(2) The widow who prior to the death of her spouse has not reached the age of 50, but has 
reached the age of 45, shall acquire the entitlement to a survivor's pension when she reaches 
the age of 50.   
(3) The widow who, during the time she was entitled to a survivor's pension under paragraph 1 
sub-para. 3 of this article, reached the age of 50, shall continue to be entitled to a survivor's 
pension permanently, and if divested of such right before she has reached the age of 50, but 
after she has reached the age of 45, she may acquire the entitlement again when she has  
reached the age of 50.    
(4) The widow who, prior to the death of her spouse or prior to the termination of the entitlement 
to survivor's pension, has reached the age of 45, shall acquire the entitlement to a survivor's 
pension even before she reaches the age of 50 if she suffers general disability to work.    
(5) A widower shall be entitled to a survivor's pension in accordance with the conditions 
specified in paragraphs 1 to 4 of this article.  
(6) A widow shall also be entitled to a survivor's pension when a child of the insured person was 
born after his death (paragraph 1 sub-para. 3) beginning from the day of the insured person's 
death. 
 
The above legal provisions clearly show that PIA does not recognise a common-law 
widow/widower as a deceased insured person’s family member. Therefore, PIA does not entitle 
a widow/widower who lived in a common-law marriage with a deceased insured person to a 





3. Article 61 of the Constitution provides as follows: 
Article 61 
The family shall enjoy special protection of the State.  
Marriage and legal relations in marriage, common-law marriage and families shall be regulated 
by law.  
 
In the Republic of Croatia the family is under the special protection of the state, so it represents 
a protected constitutional benefit. Marriage and common-law marriage are constitutionally 
recognised unions. In family matters, the Constitution makes no difference between marriage 
and common-law marriage. Both unions are recognised in the Constitution and both are 
regulated by law.  
 
Starting from the provision of Article 61 of the Constitution, which recognises two kinds of family 
unions (marriage and common-law), and taking into account the legal nature and purpose of a 
survivor’s pension in the pension insurance system, which is based on the obligation of the 
insured person to support family members (see first point of this Notification), the Constitutional 
Court finds that PIA should regulate entitlement to a survivor’s pension not only for married 
widows, but also for common-law widows and widowers.  
 
4. In examining the issues concerning the entitlement to a survivor’s pension of common-
law widows/widowers, the Constitutional Court bore in mind the fact that the Family Act 
(Narodne novine, Nos. 116/03, 17/04 and 136/04) regulates the legal effects of a common-law 
union between a woman and a man, and that in inheritance relations, pursuant to the law, the 
common-law spouse, who is in the same position as a married spouse regarding inheritance 
right, is also entitled to inherit the testator (Article 8/2 of the Inheritance Act, Narodne novine, No. 
48/03). 
 
Although the above acts are not directly applicable in the pension insurance system regulated by 
the PIA, they represent the framework for regulating the right to a survivor’s pension for 
widows/widowers in that system.   
 
5. Finally, the Constitutional Court stresses that the Act on the Rights of Croatian Homeland 
War Defenders and Members of their Families (Narodne novine, No. 174/04, hereinafter 
CHWDA) explicitly recognises the position of a close family member for common-law 
widows/widowers, and therefore also the right to a survivor’s pension.  
 
The common-law spouse of a deceased, captured or missing Croatian defender is recognised 
as a close family member provided that, before the defender’s death, capture or disappearance, 
they lived in a common household for at least three years, where the common-law marriage 
status, with the purpose of establishing the rights recognised in the CHWDA, is established in a 
non-contentious court proceeding (Article 6 paragraphs 2 and 3 CHWDA). 
 
6.  Starting from the fact that the rights recognised in the CHWDA (including the right to a 
survivor’s pension) are funded from the State Budget (Article 106 CHWDA), it could be said that 
the common-law spouse (also), as a close family member of a deceased, captured or missing 
Croatian defender, is entitled to some kind of state pension. The Constitutional Court therefore 
finds even stronger grounds to recognise, in the pension insurance system regulated by the PIA, 
the common-law spouse of a deceased insured person as a family member, because this 





In connection with this the Constitutional Court notes that, pursuant to Article 2 paragraph 4 
indent 1 of the Constitution, the Croatian Parliament is empowered to regulate all issues 
regarding the right of a common-law spouse to a survivor’s pension (e.g. which union of a man 
and woman would be considered a common-law marriage within the meaning of the PIA, the 
manner of proving it, under which special conditions would the right to a survivor’s pension be 
recognised to a common-law spouse, to what extent etc. 
 
7.  In accordance with the above, the Constitutional Court notifies the Croatian Parliament 
about the need to amend the PIA with the purpose of regulating the legal conditions for 
entitlement to a survivor’s pension of a common-law widow/widower, as a member of the 
deceased insured person’s family. 
 
Another case of legislative omission, and the only one of its kind in the practice to date 
of the Constitutional Court, is that when the legislator did not enact a new provision 
instead of the one repealed by a decision of the Constitutional Court. In its Report to the 
Croatian Parliament, No.: U-X-2191/2007 of 20 June 2007, the Constitutional Court 
stated as follows:  
 
1. The Constitutional Court of the Republic of Croatia passed, on 31 March 1998, decision 
No U-I-762/1996 and repealed the provision of Article 40 para. 2 of the Apartment Lease Act 
(Narodne novine, No 91/96). In that decision the Constitutional Court also ordered that the 
disputed legal provision should lose its legal force six months from the day of its publication in 
Narodne novine.  
 
The decision was published in Narodne novine No. 48 of 6 April 1998. 
  
The repealed provision of Article 40 para. 2 of the Apartment Lease Act reads: 
 
“(2) For the cases in para. 1 sub-para. 2 of the Apartment Lease Act, a landlord may terminate a 
lease agreement concluded for an indefinite period only if he/she has provided the lessee with 
another appropriate apartment with living conditions not less favourable for the lessee.” 
 
The above provision was related to the grounds for termination of a lease in Article 21 para. 1 of 
the Apartment Lease Act, pursuant to which a landlord (owner) may terminate a lease 
agreement concluded for an indefinite period of time if he/she, among other things, intends to 
move into the apartment himself/herself or intends to move his/her descendants, parents or 
persons whom he/she is, pursuant to separate regulations, obliged to support.  
 
In the decision repealing Article 40 para. 2 of the Apartment Lease Act (point III.12) the 
Constitutional Court expressed the following view: 
 
“The disputed provision conditions the right of a landlord to terminate a lease agreement if 
he/she intends to move into the apartment himself/herself or intends to move his/her 
descendants, parents or persons he/she is, pursuant to separate regulations, obliged to support, 
with the obligation to provide the lessee with another appropriate apartment with living conditions 
not less favourable for the lessee, that is, in the same way as stipulated in Article 21 para. 2 of 
the Apartment Lease Act which the Court found in breach of the Constitution. Therefore, the 
reasons stated in point III.6 stand here as well, for which reasons, and also for not being 
sufficiently selective, the provision should have been repealed in relation to protected tenants 




its repeal should have been postponed within the meaning of Article 21 para. 2 of the 
Constitutional Act on the Constitutional Court (Narodne novine, No 13/91), which was done in 
point 1.2. of the Decision. The legislator can, within the determined period of six months, 
appropriately regulate the requirements for termination within the meaning of the provision of 
Article 40 para. 1 sub-para. 1 of the Lease Act. 
 
Along with the above, the provision of Article 40 para. 1 sub-para. 2, stipulating the obligation of 
a unit of local self-government i.e., the City of Zagreb, to provide the lessee with another 
appropriate apartment, has no effect on the review of the disputed provision of para 2.” 
 
We enclose in this Report the Constitutional Court Decision No. U-I-762/1996 of 13 March 1998. 
 
2. The Government of the Republic of Croatia informed the Constitutional Court that the first 
reading of the Proposal for the Revisions and Amendments to the Apartment Lease Act was 
deliberated on at the session of the Croatian Parliament held on 29 January 2003. 
The Constitutional Court observes that the Croatian Parliament failed, in the period from the 
publication of the stated Constitutional Court decision (6 April, 1998) to the date when its 
repealing effect entered into force (6 October, 1998), to revise or amend Article 40 of the 
Apartment Lease Act in accordance with the legal stand expressed in the stated Constitutional 
Court decision, and it failed to do so by the time of asserting this Report. 
 
3. In the period after the Constitutional Court decision was delivered, i.e. after the repealed 
legal provision lost its legal force, owners of apartments (landlords) filed a considerate number of 
proceedings before the competent courts for terminating lease agreements, pursuant to the 
provisions of Article 40 para. 1. sub-para. 1 of the Apartment Lease Act.  
 
According to the Constitutional Court records, the Constitutional Court filed constitutional 
complaints against the decisions of courts on the suits filed by the owners of apartments 
(landlords) to evict the lessees, with no prior determination of the requirements for such evictions 
in the Apartment Lease Act. Constitutional complaints were lodged, depending on the 
judgments, by the owners and lessees, because they deemed that these judgments violated 
their constitutional rights.  
 
In response to such constitutional complaints, the Constitutional Court has, in two cases (U-III-
135/2003 and U-III-485/2006), postponed the eviction of lessees until the constitutional 
complaint is decided on. The Constitutional Court did not deliver its decision on the stated 
constitutional complaints because the Croatian Parliament failed to execute the repealing 
decision of the Constitutional Court, this being a prerequisite for deciding on the substance of 
the case in these constitutional complaints. 
 
4.  Pursuant to the provisions of Article 31 of the Constitutional Act on the Constitutional 
Court of the Republic of Croatia (hereinafter: the Constitutional Act), Constitutional Court 
decisions are obligatory and all bodies of the central government shall, within their constitutional 
and legal jurisdiction, execute the decisions of the Constitutional Court.     
The Constitutional Court notes that it has no authority, within its jurisdiction, to remove the 
inconsistency in the application of the Apartment Lease Act that came about after the repealed 
legal provision had lost its force. Decisions of the Constitutional Court (acceptance or refusal of 
constitutional complaints) would lead to further inequality before the law, that being contrary to 
the constitutional guarantee in Article 14 para. 2 of the Constitution. Therefore, the existing 
normative situation is not acceptable and admissible in constitutional law, since it fails to solve 





It follows that only the legislator is empowered to regulate, by passing the respective revisions 
and amendments to the Apartment Lease Act, the disputed legal relations in a manner which will 
ensure the equality of all before the law.  
 
5. Monitoring the execution of constitutionality and legality, and bearing in mind the 
obligatory execution of Constitutional Court decisions (Article 31 of the Constitutional Act), 
pursuant to Article 128 sub-para. 5 of the Constitution of the Republic of Croatia and Article 104 
of the Constitutional Act, this Report is being delivered to the Croatian Parliament. 
 
The cases in which the Constitutional Court took the view that it is not empowered to 
decide on the existence of legal gaps in proceedings of reviewing the constitutionality of 
laws or the constitutionality and legality of other regulations are listed in the answer to 
question 3.4 . 
 
3.4. Legislative omission in laws and other legal acts. 
 
Does the constitutional court investigate and assess the gaps of legal regulation 
only in laws or in other legal acts as well (for example, international agreements, 
substatutory acts, etc.)? Does legislative omission mean only a gap in the legal 
regulation that is in conflict with the constitution, or a gap in the legal regulation 
that is in conflict with legal regulation of higher power as well (for example, when 
an act of the government does not include the elements of the legal regulation 
which, under the constitution or the law which is not in conflict with the 
constitution, are necessary)? Is it possible to perceive legislative omission in the 
cases of delegated legislation, when the notion “may” (“has the right”) is used 
while delegating, while the regulation established in the substatutory act includes 
only part of the said delegation?   
 
In its previous practice the Constitutional Court has several time ruled that it is not 
empowered to decide on the existence of legal gaps (from the position that the legislator 
omitted to prescribe something) in the proceedings of reviewing the constitutionality of 
laws and the constitutionality and legality of other regulations. For example, besides the 
ruling of the Constitutional Court No.: U-II-1315/2001 of 9 May 2003, already mentioned 
and quoted (in reference to the Ordinance on the Excessive Use of Public Roads, whose 
enactment was stipulated by the Public Roads Act, see a quotation from that ruling in 
the answer to question 2.3.), the Constitutional Court took an identical stand in the 
following cases: U-I-104/1999 of 20 October 1999 (in connection with a provision of the 
Political Parties Act); U-I-709/2005 of 1 March 2000 (in connection with certain 
provisions of the General Administrative Procedure Act); U-I-11/1993 and U-I-904/1995 
of 24 May 2000 (in connection with a provision of the Inheritance Act); U-I-2788/2003 of 
22 December 2004 (in connection with a provision of the Labour (Revisions and 
Amendments) Act); U-I-1108/1998 of 22 December 2004 (in connection with the Labour 
Act); U-I-2273/2001 of 9 February 2005 (also in connection with the Labour Act); U-I-
4045/2003 of 12 January 2005 (in connection with the Parliamentary Election Act); U-I-
304/2001 of 21 December 2005 (in connection with certain provisions of the Communal 




Family Act); U-I-2519/2004 and U-I-31/2006 of 21 March 2007 (in connection with a 
provision of the Value Added Tax Act), U-I-5001/2004 of 18 April 2007 (in connection 
with provisions of the Customs Act),  U-I-3784/2004 of 30 October 2004 (in connection 
with the Reconstruction Act); U-I-1013/1997 of 17 October 2007 (in connection with the 
Transformation of Rights to Socially-Owned Assets of Former Socio-Political 
Organisations Act), etc.   
 
Since the Constitutional Court as a rule learns about the existence of legal gaps and 
legislative omissions in proceedings of abstract control, and in connection with what has 
already been said about these proceedings in question 3.1. and the question asked here 
about legal gaps in international agreements, it is necessary to say that the 
Constitutional Court in Ruling No.: U-I-825/2001 of 14 January 2004 took the stand that 
it does not have the power to decide on the conformity of international agreements with 
the Constitution (so-called subsequent control). Article 140 of the Constitution provides, 
among other things, that the provisions of international agreements may be amended or 
repealed only under the conditions and in the way that they specify or in accordance 
with the general rules of international law. The Constitution does not provide for control 
of the constitutionality of international agreements before their ratification, so-called 
preliminary control. 
 
Furthermore, in the cases when abstract control refers to “another regulation” (a 
constitutional concept in Article 128 sub-para. 2 of the Constitution) it is necessary to 
note that the Constitutional Court, in every such case, first investigates (in accordance 
with criteria it elaborated through its jurisprudence) whether it is indeed a case of 
“another regulation” or not, and only when it has found that it is a case of “another 
regulation” it reviews its constitutionality and legality. 
 
The reports about occurrences of unconstitutionality observed in connection with legal 
gaps and legislative omission, which the Constitutional Court under Article 128 sub-para. 
5 of the Constitution and Article 104 of the Constitutional Act delivered to the Croatian 
Parliament, are given in the answer to question 2.3., and so is an example of the 
Constitutional Court’s proceedings under Article 129 of the Constitution and Article 105 
of the Constitutional Act on executing supervisory control over the enactment of 
operational regulations (see the answer to question 2.3., point 7 of the quoted Ruling 
No.: U-II-1315/2001 of 9 July 2003, in connection with a substatutory regulation). 
 
In connection with investigating legal gaps it is interesting to note that in its practice of 
constitutional justice the Constitutional Court encountered the question of the valid 
interpretation of laws and substatutory acts. 
 
In Ruling No.: U-I-2488/2004 of 14 November 2007, the Constitutional Court found that 
the institute of the valid interpretation of a law made by the Croatian Parliament under 
Article 119 of its Statutory Rules in the way provided for in these Rules, is in conformity 
with the Constitution only if it remains within the boundaries of legal interpretation 
(interpretative law) i.e. provides a legitimate answer to a legal doubt about which 
meaning to give to particular legal provisions. On this occasion the Constitutional Court 




interpretation change or amend the contents of the law, and that if the provisions of the 
law are to be changed or amended it is necessary to enact a law amending the said law 
in accordance with the Constitution and the Standing Rules of the Croatian Parliament. 
Furthermore, the Constitutional Court found that acts which give a valid interpretation of 
particular provisions of laws formally enter into force when they are published in 
Narodne novine so they are also not in breach of the Constitution in the sense of 
retroactive effect, because the interpretation only refers to cases that will be solved after 
the act on valid interpretation enters into force. Bearing in mind Article 89 para. 5 of the 
Constitution, whereby only individual provisions of a law may have a retroactive effect 
for exceptionally justified reasons, the Constitutional Court also noted the following: 
„Concerning the question of whether an act on the valid interpretation of a law is by its nature 
retroactive or not, we deem that its retroactive effect is in principle only apparent since all it does 
is establish which of the meanings about which there is legal doubt should be given to a certain 
provision or provisions of a law that is in force and that has no retroactive effect, so that the act 
on its valid interpretation also has no such effect.”  
 
In Ruling No.: U-II-3438/2005 of 16 May 2007, the Constitutional Court annulled the 
valid interpretation of a substatutory regulation for the following reasons: 
 
7. The Constitutional Court finds it important to emphasise that the makers of (substatutory) 
regulations are not empowered to make valid interpretations of regulations. 
A valid interpretation by its nature produces legal effects from the day when the regulation 
entered into force, which means that it has a retroactive effect. 
Under Article 89 para. 4 of the Constitution, other regulations of governmental bodies or bodies 
vested with public authority shall not have a retroactive effect.  
Physical planning documents, under Article 12 para. 2 of the Physical Planning Act, have the 
force and legal nature of a substatutory regulation so they may not have a retroactive effect by 
force of the Constitution and their valid interpretation is not permitted.“ 
 
3.5. Refusal by the constitutional court to investigate and assess legal gaps. 
 
How does the constitutional court substantiate its refusal to investigate and 
assess the constitutionality of a gap in legal regulation (absence of direct 
reference concerning such investigation in the constitution and the laws, the 
doctrine of “political questions”, the respect to the discretion of the legislator in 
law-making, etc.)?  
 
The answer to question 2.3.  includes a quotation from Ruling No.: U-II-1315/2001 of 9 
July 2003, which also shows the reasoning on which the Constitutional Court based its 
position that it is not empowered to decide about the existence of legal gaps in 
proceedings of reviewing the conformity of laws with the Constitution and the conformity 
of other regulations with the Constitution and law. A legal gap is not only the complete 
absence of a legal rule but also an incomplete and constitutionally unacceptable 
provision which, for example, leads to inequality between persons who are included in 
the provision that grants a certain right and those who are not included because of an 
omission of the legislator, but who should be included (e.g. see the reasons for Decision 




why the disputed provision was not repealed). If a legal rule is absent it is impossible for 
the Constitutional Court to repeal it, and if a legal rule is incomplete a repealing decision 
would not rectify the situation because it would, in the example given above, make the 
group of people who were granted a right by the incomplete legal rule lose this right, and 
the group of people who were not granted the right would not get it.  
 
The provisions of Article 129 (which is given in the answer to question 2.2., and it gives 
the Constitutional Court the jurisdiction of supervisory control over the enactment of 
regulations for the application of the Constitution, laws or other regulations) and 130 of 
the Constitution are of essential importance in understanding the legal opinion of the 
Constitutional Court that it is not empowered to decide about the existence of legal gaps 
(from the standpoint that the legislator omitted to regulate something) in the proceedings 
of reviewing the constitutionality of laws and the constitutionality and legality of other 
regulations. Article 130 of the Constitution (which is elaborated in detail in Articles 55-57 
of the Constitutional Act) provides that the Constitutional Court shall repeal a law if it 
finds it unconstitutional (paragraph 1), and shall repeal or annul any other regulation if it 
finds it to be unconstitutional or illegal (paragraph 2), and that if it is reviewing the 
constitutionality of a law and the constitutionality and legality of another regulation  which 
have lost their legal force, and it finds that the law was not in conformity with the 
Constitution or that the other regulation was not in conformity with the Constitution and 
law, it shall pass a decision ascertaining the unconstitutionality or illegality provided that 
not more than one year has passed from the moment of losing legal force until the 
submission of the request or the proposal to institute proceedings (paragraph 3).  
 
Legal specialists also support the above standpoint (see answer to the question 1.2.).  
 
3.6. Initiative of the investigation of the “related nature”. 
 
Can the constitutional court which does not investigate into legislative omission 
carry out the “related nature” investigation in constitutional justice cases? Are 
such investigations begun upon the request of a petitioner or on the initiative of 
the court? Were such investigations related to the protection of the constitutional 
rights and freedoms?  
 
The answers to these questions have already been given in detail in the answers to 
questions 2.2.- 2.4. and 3.1. – 3.4. Furthermore, those questions also referred to 




4.  INVESTIGATION AND ASSESSMENT OF THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF 
LEGISLATIVE OMISSION  
 
4.1 Peculiarities of the investigation of legislative omission.  
 
The peculiarities of the investigation of the legislative omission while 




legislative omission arise also in the constitutional justice cases concerning the 
violated constitutional rights and freedoms, etc.? The peculiarities of the 
investigation and assessment of legislative omission in the constitutional justice 
cases concerning the laws which guarantee the implementation of the rights and 
freedoms (civil, political, social, economical and cultural) of the person. The 
peculiarities of the investigation of the legislative omission in the laws and other 
legal acts which regulate the organisation and activity of public power. The 
peculiarities of investigation and assessment of legislative omission in private 
and public laws. The particularity of investigation of legislative omission in the 
verification of the constitutionality of international agreements. When answering 
these questions, indicate the constitutional justice cases with more typical 
examples. 
 
Starting from what has already been said, that the Constitutional Court is not 
empowered to implement a priori control and that in proceedings of a posteriori abstract 
control it is not empowered to decide on the existence of legal gaps, it must be noted 
that the problems of legal gaps and legislative omission appeared in such a small 
number of cases in the practice of the Constitutional Court that it is not possible to 
conclude from them about any peculiarities or draw conclusions of a general nature. 
Furthermore, the preceding answers have given almost all the cases that are directly or 
indirectly connected with the existence of legal gaps. 
 
4.2. Establishment of the existence of legislative omission.  
 
Specify the criteria formulated in the jurisprudence of the constitutional court of 
your country, on the grounds whereof gaps in the legal regulation may and must 
be recognised as unconstitutional. Does the constitutional court investigate only 
the disputed provisions of a law or other legal act? Does the constitutional court 
decide not to limit itself with only autonomous investigation of the content of the 
disputed provisions (or disputed act) but to analyse it in the context of the whole 
legal regulation established in the act (or even that established in the system of 
acts or the whole field of law)? Can the constitutional court investigate and 
assess legislative omission of the legal regulation that used to be valid in the 
past? Does the constitutional court state the existence of gaps in the legal 
regulation which used to be valid in the past, when it analyses the development of 
the disputed provisions (disputed act)? Does the constitutional court, when 
identifying the legislative omission, investigate and assess only the content and 
form of the legal regulation or also the practice of the implementation of the legal 
regulation? 
 
Starting from the examples of legal gaps met by the Constitutional Court in its practice, 
given in the preceding answers, and not including the cases when a hierarchically 
higher-ranking legal regulation stipulated the enactment of a hierarchically lower-ranking 




partly) is easily recognised as a legal gap (see e.g. Ruling No.: U-II-1315/2001 of 9 July 
2003 quoted in the answer to question 2.3.), in establishing the existence of legal gaps 
the Constitutional Court started from the disputed provision of the law or other regulation 
and investigated it in the context of the law or regulation in which this provision was 
contained, and also in the context of the hierarchically higher-ranking legal regulation 
and the entire relevant legal field (an example for this is the quoted reasoning of Report 
No.: U-X-1457/2007 of 18 April 2007 in the answer to question 3.3.).  
 
We note that the Constitutional Court does not investigate the practical implementation 
of a legal regulation in proceedings of abstract control but only in proceedings of 
concrete control instituted by the constitutional complaint. 
 
4.3. The methodology of revelation of legislative omission.  
 
Describe the methodology of revelation of legislative omission in the 
constitutional jurisprudence: what methods and their combination does the 
constitutional court apply while revealing legislative omission? How much 
importance falls upon grammatical, logical, historical, systemic, teleological or 
other methods of interpretation in stating the existence of legislative omission? 
Does the constitutional court, while investigating and assessing legislative 
omission, directly or indirectly refer to the case-law of the European Court of 
Human Rights, the European Court of Justice, other institutions of international 
justice and constitutional and supreme courts of other countries?    
 
The Constitutional Court has not developed a special methodology for revealing legal 
gaps and legislative omission. In its work it uses all the existing methods of 
interpretation. In doing so it refers to the case-law of the constitutional courts of 
developed European democracies, especially the Constitutional Court of Germany and 
the Constitutional Court of Austria, and it also uses the experiences of the constitutional 
courts of the new democracies. In addition, it applies in its practice (in all kinds of cases) 
the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms (hereinafter: Convention) and the decisions, judgments and legal views of the 
European Court of Human Rights, either by directly applying the relevant provision of the 
Convention interpreted in accordance with the legal views of the European Court of 
Human Rights (in cases of the abstract control of the constitutionality of a law, e.g. 
Decisions No.: U-I-149/1999 of 3 February 2000, U-I-745/1999 of 8 December 2000 
etc.), or by accepting the interpretation of the content and scope of particular legal 
principles and institutes given by the European Court of Human Rights when it applied 
the Convention in its practice (e.g. Decision No: U-I-1156/1999 of 26 January 2000, 
Decision No.: U-I-659/1994 etc. of 15 March 2000 etc.). The Constitutional Court partly 
shapes many of its decisions on the model of the decisions and judgments of the 
European Court of Human Rights, and within constitutional interpretation it applies 
principles such as the principle of proportionality, the principle of legal certainty etc., 
which allow a more complete protection of fundamental human rights and freedoms and 





4.4. Additional measures 
 
Does the constitutional court, after having stated the existence of the legislative 
omission, and if it is related to the protection of the rights of the person, take any 
action in order to ensure such rights? If yes, what are these actions?  
 
The answers to questions 2.2.-2.4. have already provided answers about the 
proceedings of the Constitutional Court under Articles 104 and 105 of the Constitutional 
Act, and the answer to question 3.3. also includes examples. 
 
Furthermore, the Constitutional Court may under Article 31 para. 4 of the Constitutional 
Act itself determine which body is authorized to execute its decision or its ruling. This is 
how it acted in Decision No.: U-I-283/1997 of 16 December 1998, in which it stated: 
 
1. The Constitutional Court of the Republic of Croatia hereby notifies the Republican 
Pension and Disability Insurance Fund of Workers of Croatia, the Republican Pension and 
Disability Insurance Fund of Independent Businessmen of Croatia and the Republican Pension 
and Disability Insurance Fund of Farmers of Croatia that on the grounds of the its Decision to 
repeal the Harmonization Act of Pensions and Other Monetary Income from Pension and 
Disability Insurance of 12 May 1998, No.: U-I-283/1997 (Narodne novine, No. 69/98), the right of 
the beneficiaries under the Harmonization Act of Pensions and Other Monetary Income from 
Pension and Disability Insurance (Narodne novine, No. 20/97) to the payment of differences 
have not ceased, nor has their right for the payments to be made in the deadlines specified in 
the Ordinance on the Deadlines and Manner of Payment of the Differences of Pensions and 
Other Monetary Income from 1 February 1995 to 31 December 1996 (Narodne novine, No. 
66/97). It therefore invites the above subjects to pay the above instalments of the difference 
without postponement.  
 
2. This decision shall be published in Narodne novine.  
(…) 
The suspension of paying this difference contravenes the Decision of the Constitutional Court of 
12 May 1998, No.: U-I-283/1997, because it has deprived the pension beneficiaries of a legally 
acquired right to payment, which did not cease to exist even after the Decision of the 
Constitutional Court.  
 
Thus the Constitutional Court, under Article 25 paras. 2 and 3 of the Constitutional Act on the 
Constitutional Court of the Republic of Croatia (Narodne novine, No. 13/91), invited the 
republican pension and disability insurance funds to pay the above unconstitutionally and 
illegally suspended instalments of the difference without delay.  
 
4.5. The constitutional court investigates legislative omission as an element of the 
investigation of the case of constitutional justice, but it does not assess its 
constitutionality. 
 
Is a gap in legal regulation (legislative omission) stated in the reasoning part of 




subject of law-making) drawn to the necessity to fill in the gap (legislative 
omission): is an advice set forth to the legislator (other subject of law-making) on 
how to avoid such deficiencies of legal regulation (are there any specified criteria 
of a possible legal regulation and recommended deadlines for the adoption of the 
amendments)? 
Does the constitutional court set forth in the reasoning part of its decision how 
the legal regulation is to be understood so that it would not include the legislative 
omission, by this essentially changing the existing legal regulation (actually by 
supplementing it)? 
Does the constitutional court state the existence of legislative omission or other 
gap in the legal regulation in the reasoning part of its decision and does it specify 
that such inexistence of the legal regulation is to be filled in when courts of 
general jurisdiction apply the general principles of law?     
Does the constitutional court apply other models of assessment and filling in 
legislative omission? 
 
The preceding answers give almost all the cases that are directly or indirectly connected 
to the question of legal gaps the Constitutional Court met in its practice, and how the 
Constitutional Court proceeded in such cases (see the answers to questions 2.3.-3.5.).  
The Constitutional Court has no other models except those given above. 
 
4.6. Assessment of legislative omission in the resolution of the constitutional 
court decision. 
 
The constitutional court, after it has stated the existence of the legislative 
omission in the reasoning part of its decision, in the resolution of the decision 
performs the following: 
 
a) recognises the law (other legal act) as being in conflict with the constitution; 
 
b) recognises the provisions of the law (other legal act) as being in conflict with 
the constitution; 
 
c) leaves the act (provisions thereof) to be in effect and at the same time 
recognises the failure to act by the legislator (other subject of law-making) as 
unconstitutional by specifying the time period in which, under the constitution, 
the obligatory legal regulation must be established; 
 
d) states the duty of the legislator (other subject of law-making) to fill in the legal 
gap (by specifying or without specifying the filling in of the legal gap); 
 
e) states the existence of a gap in the legal regulation and points out that it may 





f) obligates courts of general jurisdiction and specialised courts to suspend the 
consideration of the cases and not to apply the existing legal regulation until the 
legislator (other subject of law-making) fills in the gap;  
 
g) states the existence of the gap in the legal regulation without drawing direct 
conclusions or establishing any assignments; 
 
h) applies other models of assessment of legislative omission. 
 
All the ways in which the Constitutional Court proceeds have already been given in the 
answers to questions 2.3. and 3.3. Briefly, if the Constitutional Court, in proceedings of 
abstract control, states the existence of a legal gap or legislative omission in the 
reasoning of the decision (such a request or proposal will be dismissed for lack of 
jurisdiction) it does not as a rule repeal such a provision or regulation but gives them the 
qualification of “observed appearance of unconstitutionality or illegality” and reports 
thereof to the competent body so that it may fill in the legal gap or the legislative 
omission. A second possibility is that in executing supervisory control over the 
enactment of regulations for the execution of the Constitution, laws and other regulations 
it delivers a report to the competent body (the Government or Parliament) for the 
enactment of the regulation (completely or in part) that was not enacted but should have 
been enacted.  
 
4.7. The “related nature” investigation and decisions adopted. 
 
What is typical for the “related nature” investigation carried out in the 
constitutional justice cases by the constitutional court which does not investigate 
the legislative omission? The peculiarities of decisions adopted in such cases. 
When answering this question, point out the constitutional justice cases with 
more typical examples. 
 
The answers to these question, including examples, have already been given in the 
answers to questions 2.2.-2.4. and 3.1.-3.4.  
 
4.8. Means of the legal technique which are used by the constitutional court when 
it seeks to avoid the legal gaps which would appear because of the decision 
whereby the law or other legal act is recognised as being in conflict with the 
constitution. 
 
What means of the legal technique are used by the constitutional court when it 
seeks to avoid the legal gaps which would appear because of the decision 
whereby the law or other legal act is recognised as being in conflict with the 
constitution? Postponement of the official publishing of the constitutional court 
decision. Establishment of a later date of the coming into force of the 




investigated act complies with the constitution temporarily, at the same time 
specifying that in case that the act is not amended till a certain time, it will be in 
conflict with the constitution. Recognition of the act as being in conflict with the 
constitution due to the legislative omission, without removing such act from the 
legal system. Interpretation of the act (provisions thereof) which complies with the 
constitution, in order to avoid the statement that the act (provisions thereof) is in 
conflict with the constitution due to the legislative omission. “Revival” of 
previously effective legal regulation. Other models of the decision are chosen 
(describe them).  
 
The Constitutional Court is careful, and also makes use of the appropriate legal means 
at its disposal to do so, that its decisions repealing a law (provisions thereof) and 
repealing or annulling other regulations (provisions thereof) do not result in legal gaps in 
the legal order, and thus also in legal uncertainty in a particular legal field.   
 
In proceedings in which it decides on the conformity of laws with the Constitution and on 
the conformity of other (substatutory) regulations with the Constitution and law, the 
Constitutional Court may, if it finds that a law or another regulation (provisions thereof) is 
not in conformity with the Constitution or the Constitution and law, repeal such a law 
(provision thereof) or other regulation (provision thereof), and this could lead to a legal 
gap in the legal order. However, no legal gaps as a rule occur because under Article 55 
para. 2 of the Constitutional Act, the repealed law (provision thereof) or other regulation 
(provision thereof) lose legal force on the day when the Constitutional Court decision is 
published in Narodne novine, unless the Constitutional Court sets another term. And the 
Constitutional Court, depending on the circumstances of each individual case, always 
takes into account the time the legislator needs to enact a new law or other regulation or 
just a separate provision, and it sets the term depending on the kind and scope of the 
repealed regulation and of its importance and influence on society as a whole. Thus, for 
example, in Decision No.: U-I-1152/2000 etc. of 18 April 2007 the Constitutional Court 
ruled that the separate repealed provisions of the Pension Insurance Act shall not go out 
of force until 31 December 2018 (about ten years after the time when the decision was 
passed), and in Decision No.: U-I-1569/2004 of 20 December 2006 that the separate 
repealed provisions of the Civil Procedure Act shall not go out of force until 15 July 2008 
(about one and a half years after the decision was passed).  
 
On the other hand, there are cases when the Constitutional Court passed decisions to 
extend the postponed entry into force of repealed legal provisions several times at the 
legislator’s request. For example, in Decision No.: U-I-1010/1994 of 29 November 1995 
the Constitutional Court repealed the Public Information Act, which was to go out of 
force on 30 June 1996. After the decision to repeal the Public Information Act, the 
Constitutional Court in decisions of 28 June 1996 and 29 August 1996 prolonged the 
deadline for the Act to go out of force to 31 August 1996, and to 30 September 1996 
The new Public Information Act (Narodne novine, No. 83/96) entered into force on the 





Furthermore, the Constitutional Court may not annul a law but may annul another 
regulation (provisions thereof) and must annul it if it violates the human rights and 
fundamental freedoms guaranteed in the Constitution, and if it without grounds places 
some individuals, groups or associations in a more or less privileged position (Article 55 
para. 3 of the Constitutional Act). In this case, too, the annulled regulation (provision 
thereof) shall not be applied from the day when the decision of the Constitutional Court 
enters into force, or from the day of publication, or from another term set by the 
Constitutional Court.  
 
5. CONSEQUENCES OF THE STATEMENT OF THE EXISTENCE OF LEGISLATIVE 
OMISSION IN CONSTITUTIONAL COURT DECISIONS  
 
5.1. Duties arising to the legislator. 
Does the statement of the existence of legislative omission in a decision of the 
constitutional court mean a duty of the legislator to properly fill in such gap of 
legal regulation? Does the regulation of the parliament provide how the questions 
are considered concerning the implementation of the constitutional court 
decision? Does the parliament promptly react to the decisions of the 
constitutional court, wherein the legislative omission is states? Are there cases 
when the parliament disregarded the decisions of the constitutional court 
concerning the legislative omission? How is it ensured that the parliament would 
implement the duty which has appeared due to the decision of the constitutional 
court? What are the powers and role of the constitutional court in this sphere?     
 
Under Article 31 of the Constitutional Act the decisions and the rulings of the 
Constitutional Court are obligatory and every individual or legal person shall obey them 
(paragraph 1). All bodies of the central government and of local and regional self-
government shall, within their constitutional and legal jurisdiction, execute the decisions 
and the rulings of the Constitutional Court (paragraph 2). The Government of the 
Republic of Croatia ensures, through the bodies of central administration, the execution 
of the decisions and the rulings of the Constitutional Court (paragraph 3). The 
Constitutional Court may determine which body is authorized to execute its decision or 
its ruling (paragraph 4). The Constitutional Court may determine the manner in which its 
decision or its ruling shall be executed (paragraph 5). 
 
Starting from the above provisions of Article 31 of the Constitutional Act and the 
jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court (see the answers to questions 2.2. and 2.3.), we 
note that the reports the Constitutional Court delivers to the Croatian Government or the 
Croatian Parliament act with the power of the authority of the Constitutional Court and 
the existence of the so-called “general obligation” contained in Article 5 para. 1 (principle 
of constitutionality and legality) and paragraph 2 (everyone shall abide by the 





The provisions of the Constitutional Act and the Standing Rules of the Croatian 
Parliament do not explicitly prescribe how questions of complying with the decisions of 
the Constitutional Court will be addressed. The speed with which the Croatian 
Parliament reacts to decisions of the Constitutional Court differs from case to case.  
As a rule the legislator honours the Constitutional Court’s deadlines for enacting a new 
law instead of the one that has been repealed and new legal provisions instead of those 
that have been repealed. However, there are cases when the new laws that are enacted 
to replace repealed ones, or the new legal provisions enacted to replace repealed ones, 
are not enacted on time (see example in the answer to question 4.8.), and there is also a 
case when, because of a long lapse of time, no new legal provision was enacted instead 
of the one that was repealed (see e.g. Report No.: U-X-2191/2007 of 20 June 2007, 
whose reasoning was quoted in the answer to question 3.3.). 
 
5.2. Duties arising to other subjects of law-making (for example, the Head of State, 
the Government). 
Does the statement of the existence of legislative omission in a decision of the 
constitutional court mean the duty of other law-making subjects to properly fill in 
such a gap of legal regulation? Do the acts regulating the activity of these 
subjects provide how the said subjects implement the constitutional court 
decisions? Do the said subjects promptly react to the decisions of the 
constitutional court, wherein the legislative omission is stated? Are there any 
cases when these subjects disregarded the decisions of the constitutional court 
concerning the legislative omission? How is it ensured that the said subjects 
would properly implement such duty? What are the powers and role of the 
constitutional court in this sphere?  
 
This question has been answered in the answer to the preceding question.  
 
Furthermore, in proceedings of concrete control when the Constitutional Court, deciding 
on a constitutional complaint, finds that the general court’s interpretation when filling in a 
legal gap in a regulation is constitutionally unacceptable (Decision No.: U-III-1621/2001 
of 30 March 2005, see the answer to question 2.3.), and if the Constitutional Court 
accepts the constitutional complaint and quashes the disputed (individual) act, the 
competent judicial or administrative body, body of local and regional self-government or 
legal person vested with public powers, whose act was quashed, has the obligation to 
pass a new act instead of the one that was quashed (Article 76 para. 2 of the 
Constitutional Act). When passing the new act these bodies are obliged to obey the legal 
opinion of the Constitutional Court expressed in the decision on quashing the act in 
which the applicant’s constitutional right was violated (Article 77 para. 2 of the 
Constitutional Act).            
 
 
6. WHEN DRAWING CONCLUSIONS concerning the experience of the 
constitutional court of your state regarding consideration of cases by the 




questions: is it possible to consider such investigations as an important activity 
of the constitutional court (explain why), does the constitutional court have 
sufficient legal instruments of such investigation and how do the constitutional 
court decisions influence the process of law-making in such cases?  
 
The Constitutional Court of the Republic of Croatia has in its practice met and meets the 
question of legal gaps and its activities in relation to this question may be considered 
significant in the measure to which it contributes to the total stability of the legal order 
and the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms guaranteed in the 
Constitution.  
 
Constitutional justice to date shows that the Constitutional Court has filled in legal gaps 
through constitutional jurisprudence by first establishing rules of procedure through its 
case-law, then by their autonomous regulation in the Standing Rules of the 
Constitutional Court, from which the legislator adopted them entirely in amendments of 
the Constitutional Act on the Constitutional Court. Furthermore, although the 
Constitutional Court found that it does not have the power to decide about the existence 
of legal gaps in proceedings of reviewing the constitutionality of laws and 
constitutionality and legality of other regulations, it is in these proceedings that it states 
the existence of legal gaps (either when rules are completely absent or when provisions 
are incomplete and their wording leads to inequality or discrimination). In this case it, as 
a rule, either reports to the Croatian Parliament about the occurrence of 
unconstitutionality or illegality it observed, or it, within the framework of its authority to 
execute supervisory control over the enactment of regulations for executing the 
Constitution, laws and other regulations, reports to the Government or Parliament that 
the competent body which had the obligation to enact a regulation did not enact it either 
completely or partly. In this way it contributes to filling in legal gaps observed i.e. to the 
enactment of the necessary laws and other regulations. The Constitutional Court has so 
far filed the largest number of applications in the execution of supervisory control over 
the enactment of operational instruments, either by natural or legal persons, in which 
they indicate the existence of legal gaps i.e. the non-enactment of operational 
instruments by competent bodies. In most cases, after the Constitutional Court 
requested statements about the applications from these bodies, they informed it that the 
regulations had in the meantime been enacted.  
 
Therefore, the Constitutional Court has at its disposal certain legal instruments for 
examining legal gaps, which it makes use of in its practice and in this way influences the 
creation of laws and other regulations in the cases given above.  
 
Note: If possible, present the statistical data about the considered cases related to 
legislative omission and their relation with other cases together with the national 
report. 
 
The number of cases that refer to legal gaps is small in relation to the total number of 
filed cases and the Constitutional Court does not keep special records about them. The 
statistical data available are given in the answer to question 3.2. 
